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I. Introduction
In July of 2011, the city of Central Falls, Rhode Island, was
on a path towards municipal bankruptcy.1 It carried a structural
budget deficit of approximately $6 million per year and had no
cash on hand to pay the $80 million in pension and health
insurance benefits it owed to its retired police officers and

1. See Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains
Approval, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/cen
tral-falls-ri-to-emerge-from-bankruptcy.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015)
(describing Central Fall’s dire financial straits) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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firefighters.2 Its principal creditors included pensioners,
municipal employees, and general obligation (GO) bondholders.3
In Providence, state legislators were concerned about the
economic consequences that might follow if the city made the
politically popular choice: filing for bankruptcy, then cutting
bondholder repayments (as opposed to current and former
employee benefits).4 In an attempt to “lure investors to bonds that
will be sold by other Rhode Island municipalities,” the General
Assembly passed a law guaranteeing that Central Fall’s
bondholders would be repaid in full in the event of a municipal
bankruptcy—a contingency that occurred when the city filed its
petition two weeks later.5
Ultimately, the plan worked.6 After a year in bankruptcy, a
federal judge approved Central Falls’ reorganization plan, which
repaid GO bondholders in full while slashing some pensions by up
to fifty-five percent.7 With a clear priority structure established
by state law, Central Falls avoided protracted litigation between
GO bondholders and other creditors and exited bankruptcy in
“record time” and with “record efficiency.”8 Shortly thereafter,
2. See id. (noting that the city “found itself with a structural budget deficit
of about $6 million, and with no way to pay the roughly $80 million it owed in
pension and health insurance benefits to more than 200 police officers and
firefighters”).
3. See id. (listing these groups as creditors during the pendency of the
bankruptcy case).
4. Michael Corkery, Bondholders Win in Rhode Island, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
4, 2011, 12:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240531119038856045
76486610528775994 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (describing the law, the property
interest it created in favor of all GO bondholders, and its implications in the
Central Falls bankruptcy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. See id. (describing the city’s plan to repay bondholders “the entire
$635,000 it owes them” while reducing claims made by other creditor groups,
like pensioners, by up to 34%). Without the law, state legislators argued, “future
bond deals in Rhode Island likely would need to carry higher interest rates in
order to entice potential buyers scared by the Central Falls bankruptcy filing.”
Id. For a more complete description of the law, its mechanics, and its effects, see
infra notes 150–154.
6. See infra notes 7–9 and accompanying text (describing the relative
success of the law in protecting GO bondholder interests and ensuring a quick
municipal recovery by sustaining access to credit markets).
7. See Bidgood, supra note 1 (indicating that the effect of the Rhode Island
law was to create a property right recognizable in bankruptcy and that this
property right was why the municipality could repay its bondholders in full).
8. Id.
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Moody’s upgraded its outlook on Central Falls’ GO bonds from
junk bond status to “positive.”9
A few short weeks after Central Falls petitioned for
bankruptcy relief, Jefferson County, Alabama, filed for its own
four billion-dollar bankruptcy.10 In this case, the county defaulted
on a series of “sewer revenue bonds”—bonds that were issued to
fund a new county sewer system and that were payable from the
user fees generated by that system.11 During the two years that
the county remained in bankruptcy,12 the presiding judge
required the county to continue to pay principal and interest on
its sewer revenue bonds, even though they lacked the same kind
of state statute-based priority enjoyed by the GO bondholders in
Central Falls.13
9. See Moody’s Upgrades Formerly Bankrupt Central Falls, R.I., REUTERS
(Jul. 18, 2013, 5:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/18/usarhodeisland-centralfalls-rating-idUSL1N0FO27920130718 (last visited Apr. 2,
2015) (explaining that Moody’s upgraded the credit rating for Central Falls’
general obligation debt based on its “belief that Central Falls will maintain its
structural balance” by continuing to make its reduced pension contributions) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. Mary William Walsh, Alabama Governor Fails to Prevent County’s
Record $4 Billion Bankruptcy Filing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/us/alabama-governor-fails-to-preventjefferson-countys-record-4-billion-bankruptcy-filing.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2015) (explaining that Jefferson County entered bankruptcy in November of
2011 with $4 billion in overall debt) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
11. See Mary Williams Walsh, Bankruptcy Filing Raises Doubts About a
Bond
Repayment
Pledge,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
23,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/business/in-alabama-a-test-of-the-full-faithand-credit-pledge-to-repay-bonds.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (explaining
how revenue bond financing works and noting that “[m]ost of Jefferson County’s
$4.1 billion of debt is, in fact, the revenue type” of bond debt as opposed to GO
debt) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Walsh, supra note 10
(“Jefferson County’s debt grew out of poorly conceived efforts to finance a courtordered rebuilding of its decrepit sewer system.”).
12. Kent Faulk, Judge Says Jefferson County Can Exit Historic $4.23
Billion Bankruptcy, AL.COM (Nov. 21, 2013, 4:13 PM) (last updated Nov. 21,
2013, 11:04 PM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2013/11/judge_says_jefferson_coun
ty_ca.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (noting a filing date of November 9, 2011
and a plan confirmation date of November 21, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See infra notes 189–191 (describing the rulings, which allowed the
county’s revenue bondholders to be paid throughout the pendency of the
bankruptcy).
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In Detroit’s recent eighteen billion-dollar bankruptcy,
bondholders were not so lucky. 14 Over the strident objections
of the bond insurers who covered the city’s default, the city
maintained that bankruptcy rendered its GO bonds worthless
and that bondholders should receive fifteen cents on the
dollar for their claims. 15 While Detroit eventually agreed to
pay bondholders seventy-four cents on the dollar after
mediation, 16 the question remains: what makes Detroit’s
bondholders so different from those in Central Falls or
Jefferson County?
Recent scholarship on Chapter 9 17 of the Bankruptcy
Code18 has focused on everything from the efficacy of
municipal bankruptcy 19 to its intersection with pensioner
14. See Michael Aneiro, Detroit Takes Aim at Bondholders, BARRONS (Jul.
20, 2013), http://online.barrons.com/article/SB5000142405274870409340457860
7853463077028.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (describing the city’s negative
outlook on repayment of its bondholders and noting that “[n]ever in the field of
municipal finance was so much owed to so many by a city with so little”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland / the Detroit Bankruptcy:
Why Debts Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never
Die . . . and How They Are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771,
837–40 (2014) (explaining how the city classified its GO debt as “unsecured,”
how this gave Detroit the ability to pay bondholders only a fraction of their
claims against the city, and how the major monoline insurers who were
responsible for footing the bill filed motions in court to challenge this
classification); Chad Halcom, Detroit Agrees to Pay Bondholders 74% on $388M
Claim in Bankruptcy, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Apr. 9, 2014, 12:14 PM) (last
updated Apr. 10, 2014, 5:57 AM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20140409/
NEWS/140409839/detroit-agrees-to-pay-bondholders-74-on-388m-claim-inbankruptcy (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (noting that “the city [originally] proposed
to issue new bond notes to the class of unlimited tax general obligation
bondholders worth about 15 percent of their present claims”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. Halcom, supra note 15.
17. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012).
18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012).
19. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and
Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012) (exploring
the possible incentives and disincentives for municipalities to abuse the
protections available under Chapter 9); Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351
(2010) (arguing that Chapter 9 is poorly designed to address the fiscal
difficulties of the municipalities that seek its protections and suggesting that
states should bear the burden of municipal rehabilitation); Juliet M.
Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
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rights 20 and collective bargaining agreements.21 However, few (if
any) writers have addressed the more intricate question of
whether, how, and why certain bondholders have claims superior
to other bondholders for scarce municipal assets.22 This Note
seeks to fill that void.
REV. 403 (2014) (maintaining that Chapter 9 is most effective when deployed as
part of an overall rehabilitation scheme that exists at both the federal and state
levels); Richard C. Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860 (2012)
(arguing that institutionalized bankruptcy proceedings like Chapter 9 do
nothing to address the underlying factors that caused the bankrupt
municipality’s fiscal distress in the first place).
20. See generally Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 3, 67–84 (2013) (exploring the impact that municipal bankruptcy
can have on pension obligations); Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions
and Property Rights in Municipal Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609,
649–59 (2014) (proposing a property rights-based structure on which to ground
priority for pensioners over other municipal stakeholders); Hannah Heck,
Comment, Solving Insolvent Public Pensions: The Limitations of the Current
Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 89 (2011) (providing a complete
overview of the impact that bankruptcy law has on pension obligation and
summarizing proposals for reform).
21. See generally Ryan Preston Dahl, Collective Bargaining Agreements
and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295 (2007) (examining the
impact of municipal bankruptcy on collective bargaining agreements); Richard
W. Trotter, Running on Empty: Municipal Insolvency and Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 45 (2011)
(same).
22. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed
Municipalities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639 (2012) (discussing the allocation of
monitoring responsibilities for municipal finances between citizens and
bondholders and concluding that bondholders should bear the lion’s share of the
burden in the case of a municipal default); Richard C. Schragger, Citizens
Versus Bondholders, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787 (2012) (performing several
historical case studies on the allocation of rights and monitoring responsibilities
between bondholders and municipal residents). Most of the articles that
mention bondholder rights and remedies at all do so in the broader, evaluative
sense without focusing on the statutory language that gives life to those rights
and remedies. See Gillette, supra; Schragger, supra. Kevin A. Kordana is one of
the few scholars to address how and why Chapter 9 treats different kinds of
bondholders differently. See Kevin Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal
Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 1035, 1046–55 (1997) (summarizing how holders of
GO bonds, revenue bonds, certificates of participation, and revenue anticipation
notes would proceed with their claims against a bankrupt municipality but
ultimately focusing on whether the Code permits compulsory tax increases).
Most other sources of information about the mechanics of bondholder rights in
bankruptcy are more technical and practitioner-oriented. See, e.g., Paul
Groenwegen, “Revenues” as Collateral: the Limits of the Revenue Pledge as a
Security Device, 39 UCC L.J. 545, 547–66 (2007) (exploring the impact of several
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Part II offers a basic primer on the kinds of bonds traded in
the municipal finance industry and analyzes how bankruptcy
alters the rights and remedies available to bondholders.23 It
concludes that the answers to two questions dictate the
treatment of municipal bonds in bankruptcy. The first question—
whether the bonds are “secured” under state statute or the terms
of the bond itself—relates to a state-by-state and case-by-case
determination of the property rights afforded to a particular set
of bondholders.24 The second question—whether the bonds are
payable from “special revenues” as defined in § 902(2)25 of the
Bankruptcy Code—is the focus of Part III.26
Part III explains how and why the current definition of
“special revenues” is too narrow to suit the needs of
municipalities and their financiers.27 It goes on to discuss the
consequences of this narrow definition, including potential
disparities between actual risk of non-payment for certain types
of bonds and the risk premiums charged by the market.28 Part III
concludes with a discussion of In re Heffernan Memorial Hospital
bankruptcy code provisions on the kinds of “pledges” made under different
municipal financing structures); Michael L. Hall & George D. Gaskin III,
Municipal Bonds in Chapter 9: A Primer, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2011, at
38, 38–39 (describing the potential treatment of GO bonds and revenue bonds in
bankruptcy). Groenwegen is the only author to mention § 902(2)—the focus of
this Note—in any detail. Compare Groenwegen, supra, at 547–66 (discussing
how the presence of “special revenues” dictates the outcome of most secured
bond transactions), with Hall, supra, at 79–80 (quoting the entirety of § 902(2)
without any substantive analysis), Hynes, supra note 20, at 650 nn.220 & 221
(referencing § 902(2) without any extensive discussion), and Kordana, supra, at
1049 n.73, 1053 n.87 (citing § 902(2) in two footnotes without any substantive
discussion).
23. See infra Part II.A (analyzing the current municipal bond market);
infra Part II.B (analyzing the effect of municipal bankruptcy on various types of
bonds currently traded on the market).
24. Infra notes 97, 181 and accompanying text.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2) (2012).
26. See infra Part III.A (exploring the five-part definition for “special
revenues” under § 902(2)).
27. See infra Part III (providing several examples of bonds not covered by
§ 902(2) and examining a bankruptcy court decision that illustrates the
shortcomings of § 902(2)).
28. Compare infra Table 1 (outlining municipal debt expectations prebankruptcy), with infra Table 2 (outlining how municipal debt is treated in
bankruptcy), and infra Table 3 (outlining which kinds of debt qualify for what
kind of treatment under Table 2).
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District,29 a bankruptcy court decision that illustrates the
shortcomings of the current definition of “special revenues” and
calls for a broader test.30
Part IV offers a new definition for special revenues that
accounts for the concerns illustrated in Part III. 31 It goes on to
suggest two means—one legislative and one driven by the
market itself—to implement the protections provided by this
new definition.32 Either method should allow public finance
professionals to alert the market in advance about the
consequences for any given group of bondholders when a
municipality declares bankruptcy.33 If properly applied, this test
will re-introduce a degree of clarity into a market muddled by
Detroit’s Chapter 9 administration.34
II. Laying Out the Problem: the Muddled Treatment of Bonds in
Bankruptcy
The public finance industry loosely groups municipal
bonds35 into three categories: (1) general obligation bonds (like
those involved in Central Falls and Detroit), 36 (2) revenue
bonds (like those involved in Jefferson County), 37 and
(3) short-term debt securities. 38 The differences in how
29. 202 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996).
30. Infra Part III.B.
31. Infra Part IV.A.
32. Infra Part IV.B–C.
33. Infra Part V.
34. See, e.g., Kevin Kordana & Chris Herzeca, What’s the Status of General
Obligation Bonds in Municipal Bankruptcy?, PUBLIC SECTOR INC. (Jan. 2014),
http://www.publicsectorinc.org/debates/whats-the-status-of-general-obligationbonds-in-municipal-bankruptcy/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (recounting a debate
between two municipal finance experts about the degree to which the Detroit
bankruptcy has muddled market expectations about the value of GO bonds) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. Unless otherwise specified, I use the words “bonds,” “notes,”
“securities,” and “devices” interchangeably to refer generally to all forms of
municipal debt obligations, including warrants, certificates of participation, and
other unique devices.
36. Supra notes 3–9, 14–16.
37. Supra notes 10–13.
38. See, e.g., ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT
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municipalities 39 structure these three types of obligations are
what create expectations regarding the risk of non-payment
outside of bankruptcy.40 As the risk of non-payment increases, the
market demands a higher “risk premium” in the form of steeper
interest rates.41 However, as Detroit revealed (and as this Part
explains), the same factors that would cause bonds to have a
lower risk of non-payment outside of a municipal bankruptcy
filing create a significantly higher risk of non-payment after a
municipal bankruptcy filing.42
A. The Mechanics of the Bond Market Pre-Bankruptcy
1. General Obligation Bonds
Outside of bankruptcy, GO bonds are the “gold standard” of
the municipal finance industry.43 By issuing a GO bond, a
municipality promises its bondholders that it will do anything
LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 25–33 (1992) (listing three types of debt under the
heading “Classification and Characteristics of Municipal Securities,” including
general obligation bonds).
39. Unless otherwise specified, I use the phrases “city,” “local entity,” and
“municipality” interchangeably throughout this Note to refer to “any political
subdivision, including a county, city, town, village or special district, and any
public agency or instrumentality of a state, including a public authority, public
benefit corporation or body corporate and politic” capable of filing for
bankruptcy under Chapter 9. Robert S. Amdursky, The 1988 Municipal
Bankruptcy Amendments: History, Purposes, and Effects, 22 URB. LAW. 1, 1 n.2
(1990).
40. See infra notes 61–65, 69–73 and accompanying text (describing market
expectations for municipal debt securities outside of bankruptcy).
41. See, e.g., Mark N. Berman, What Municipal Bond Investors Can Learn
From Detroit, LAW360 (Nov. 25, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.law360
.com/articles/599587/what-municipal-bond-investors-can-learn-from-detroit (last
visited Apr. 2, 2015) (noting that “higher interest rates flow from the perception
that [certain bonds] are at greater risk because their status as secured claims is
in doubt” and that this increases borrowing costs for municipalities) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. See infra Tables 2, 3 (demonstrating that the pre-bankruptcy
expectations about the security of various types of municipal debt do not match
the effects of bankruptcy on each of those devices).
43. Patrick Darby et al., Corporate Bankruptcy Panel: Municipal
Restructuring, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 333, 357 (2013) (statement of Patrick
Darby).

964

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 955 (2015)

within its power to repay the bonds, including raising taxes or
redirecting other available revenues.44 These promises are backed
by state law, which frequently mandates repayment of GO bonds
before any other bonds are paid.45 This combination of a
contractual promise of repayment and state-law backing gives
bondholders the right to sue in state court to enforce the
municipality’s pledge of its “full faith and credit” in the event of a
municipal default.46 Revenue bonds and short-term debt
44. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 1.3.1, at 26 (stating that
the full faith and credit pledge behind general obligation bonds means that the
issuer will “use any and all available revenue-producing powers,” including
taxation, fee generation, or assignment of payments received, to meet debt
service obligations and cover any shortfalls that may arise); W. Bartley
Hildreth, What Are General Obligation Bonds? Reactions to “Diversity and
Default Risks of Municipal Bonds,” MUN. FIN. J., Summer 2013 at 89, 91–98
(compiling dozens of definitions of GO bonds, each of which features a similar
irrevocable promise to repay bondholders using all available municipal
resources).
45. See, e.g., Hollstein v. First Nat’l Bank of Aurora, 437 N.W.2d 512, 516
(Neb. 1989) (answering a certified question by stating that, under applicable
state law, GO “bonds [must] be fully paid according to their terms prior to
utilizing revenues” to repay other types of municipal debt).
46. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, §§ 5.4.1–.2, at 241–46
(discussing the “mandamus” action, a suit brought by bondholders in state court
to enforce their rights under a GO bond agreement); Hildreth, supra note 44, at
91–98 (compiling dozens of definitions of GO bonds, almost all of which feature
this state law “full faith and credit” enforceability component). Commentators
and courts differ on the degree to which a “full faith and credit” pledge can
compel a municipality to act. Compare Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Mun. Assistance
Corp., 358 N.E.2d 848, 852 (N.Y. 1976) (finding that two state laws—one
mandating that all local debt must carry “full faith and credit” pledge and the
other allowing localities to exceed debt limits to pay debt service if required—
“express a constitutional imperative: debt obligations must be paid, even if tax
limits be exceeded”), with State v. City of Lakeland, 16 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla.
1943) (finding that a “full faith and credit” pledge “does no more . . . than
express an undertaking by the city to be irrevocably obligated” (emphasis
added)), Clayton P. Gillette, Bankruptcy and Its By-Products: A Comment on
Skeel, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1129, 1133–34 (2013) (noting, by implication, that most
states “simply mak[e] a promise to repay or pledg[e] their faith and credit”
without further guarantee rather than implementing structural mechanisms to
ensure repayment of general obligation debt), Gillette, supra note 19, at 288
(arguing that a general obligation pledge “means little more than an obligation
to exercise good faith in making payments”), and Kordana, supra note 34 (“[A]
‘full faith and credit’ pledge is, as a matter of contract law . . . , merely
equivalent to an ‘and I really mean it’ pledge, lacking the discrete and tangible
connection to a particular property interest necessary to constitute a secured
claim in bankruptcy.”).
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securities do not typically come with this kind of “full faith and
credit” pledge; only GO bonds carry these powerful contractual
rights.47 Thus, in the municipal finance world, GO bonds are
considered one of the “safest” forms of municipal debt.48
GO bonds come in three varieties: unlimited tax GO bonds
(UTGOs), limited tax GO bonds (LTGOs), and general fund
securities.49 UTGOs and LTGOs are virtually identical,50 except
for one critical difference: as the “limited” in the name suggests,
LTGOs typically contain a truncated form of a “full faith and
credit” pledge.51 In the indenture,52 a municipality will limit
LTGO bondholder recourse by capping tax increases, imposing

47. See 1 DAVID GELFAND, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT FINANCING
§ 10:17 (James A. Coniglio ed., 2d ed. 2013) (“The full-faith-and-credit guarantee
distinguishes general obligation bonds (as well as certain notes backed by full
faith and credit) from revenue bonds (and revenue anticipation notes), which are
backed only by a particular fund or revenue source.”).
48. See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State
and Local Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and
Opportunities for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1461 (2013) (“[U]nless a
municipal securities issuer (or its revenue-generating infrastructure) ceases to
exist, bondholders (particularly general obligation bondholders) are likely to get
paid.”); Christine A. Scheel, Comment, Amended SEC Rule 15c2-12: An Attempt
to Improve Disclosure Practices in the Municipal Securities Market, 45 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1117, 1122 n.29 (1996) (“[M]unicipal general obligation bonds [are]
conventionally perceived as a very safe investment because investors could look
to all of the municipality’s revenue sources for repayment.”).
49. See KROLL BOND RATINGS, NOT ALL G.O. BONDS ARE CREATED EQUAL 4
(2013),
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/seminars/2014/20140205/kroll.pdf
(listing and comparing all three forms in one chart); Robert Doty, Diversity and
Default Risks of Municipal Bonds, MUN. FIN. J., Summer 2013, at 57–65
(describing all three of these types of securities and comparing them).
50. See KROLL, supra note 49, at 4–5 (comparing UTGOs and LTGOs and
concluding that LTGOs are a close variant of UTGOs); Doty, supra note 49, at
57–61 (defining UTGOs and LTGOs together and only adding a minor footnote
to suggest any variation).
51. See KROLL, supra note 49, at 5 (“[T]his pledge limits the ability of the
issuer to levy property taxes. These property tax limits can be in the form of an
absolute cap on the millage rate or a limit on the total dollar amount of taxes
that can be levied in any one fiscal year.”).
52. Unless otherwise specified, I use the terms “security agreement” and
“indenture” to refer to any indenture, authorizing resolution, or other document
prepared by the issuer that contains the terms and conditions of a particular
issuance. See generally infra notes 112–114 and accompanying text (defining
and describing typical terms in an indenture).

966

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 955 (2015)

maximum dollar values on taxes collected, or limiting payment to
a particular tax source (like a portion of a general sales tax).53
Like UTGOs, and unlike LTGOs, general fund securities are
typically payable from any available general funds.54 However,
general fund securities are not secured by the “full faith and
credit” of the municipality or by liens against future revenue
streams.55 Instead, the mechanism used to structure the general
fund security dictates how likely it is that it will be repaid. For
“collateralized” general fund securities (called “certificates of
participation” (COPs) in California), municipalities sell fractional
interests in a lease agreement to the public.56 In other words,
holders of Californian COPs own the right to collect a certain
percentage of the lease payments made by the municipality to a
trustee under the lease agreement.57 For “uncollateralized”
53. See, e.g., METRO. WATER RECLAMATION DIST. OF GREATER CHI., OFFICIAL
STATEMENT 5 (2006), http://emma.msrb.org/MS248796-MS224104-MD436
403.pdf (making LTGOs payable only from ad valorem revenues collected from
all property in the district up to a certain amount dictated by state statute);
CITY OF BESSEMER, LIMITED OBLIGATION LIBRARY WARRANTS 6–7 (2012),
http://emma.msrb.org/EP712352-EP552465-EP953577.pdf (limiting repayment
sources to two property taxes specifically levied to finance library reconstruction
and refusing to pledge any additional revenues for repayment); Glossary of
Municipal Securities Terms, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BOARD, http://msrb.org/
glossary/definition/limited-tax-general-obligation-bond.aspx (last visited Apr. 2,
2015) (defining a limited tax general obligation bond as a “general obligation
bond payable from ad valorem taxes that are limited by law in rate or amount”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. See Doty, supra note 49, at 61–62 (“General fund securities
are . . . payable from whatever monies happen to be in an issuer’s general
fund.”).
55. See id. at 61 (“[G]eneral fund securities do not have the protections of
statutory liens or of pledges enforceable under state law to increase taxes.”).
56. GELFAND, supra note 47, § 12:8 (explaining that COPs provide their
holders with “a security interest in property being leased to the public agency
borrowing the funds in case the agency should terminate its lease or default in it
rental payments”).
57. CAL. DEBT ADVISORY COMM’N, GUIDELINES FOR LEASES AND CERTIFICATES
OF
PARTICIPATION
4
(1993),
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/reports/
Guidelines93-8.pdf (“Technically, a COP is a security that evidences an
undivided fractional interest in an underlying lease or installment sale
agreement. In other words, a COP entitles its owner to a proportionate share of
lease . . . payments made by a government agency pursuant to a
lease . . . agreement.”). Because collateralized debtholders are secured by their
fractional ownership interest in the leased asset or facility itself, they do have
some limited security in that they can typically foreclose on the facility. See
Doty, supra note 49, at 62 n.15 (explaining that lease financings and certificates
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general fund securities, municipalities sell investors the general
right to future payments made by the municipality.58 In either
case, payment depends upon the municipality’s decision to make
the promised annual or semi-annual payment.59 Nothing
guarantees that the municipality will continue to make these
appropriations, making general fund securities a “risky”
investment.60
The contractual rights provided by UTGOs and LTGOs are
not property rights.61 A municipality cannot typically grant
creditors an interest in public property by mortgaging its roads or
its schools.62 Where state law does not directly prevent it, most
courts have held mortgaging municipal property is against public
policy.63 However, outside bankruptcy, the contractual rights
of participation are “collateralized” because the “leased property serves as
collateral” and creditors can reclaim and re-lease the property itself in the event
of a municipal default).
58. See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846, 2014 WL 7409724, at *33–
34 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Dec. 31, 2014) (explaining COPs issued by Detroit, in
which the city entered into service agreements with shell corporations to fund
the city’s pension obligations in exchange for future contract payments; a shell
trustee then issued COPs that granted holders the rights to a proportional share
of those future contract payments).
59. See, e.g., KROLL, supra note 49, at 5 (noting that certain general
obligation warrants at issue in the Jefferson County bankruptcy were
“essentially a general fund pledge” because the County was “under no obligation
to raise property taxes or other taxes and fees” in order to make debt service
payments).
60. See Doty, supra note 49, at 63 (“For those who emphasize the risks of
municipal fiscal stress, then, the securities to watch are general fund securities,
especially uncollateralized general fund securities, not general obligation
bonds.”).
61. See GELFAND, supra note 47, § 3:16 (noting that GO bonds do not create
a property interest, like a lien, in favor of GO bondholders “without a specific
statutory or constitutional provision”).
62. See S. REP. 100-506, at 25 (1988) (“[M]ost municipalities cannot
mortgage their real property . . . .”); Legislation to Amend Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100 Cong. 70 (1988) [hereinafter House
Hearing] (“[M]unicipal law prohibits the encumbrance of municipal property
with mortgages.”).
63. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 13 (noting that most municipalities cannot
create real property mortgages “either for legal reasons or because of compelling
considerations of public policy”). But see Peter Molk, Comment, Broadening the
Use of Municipal Mortgages, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 397, 406 (2010) (stating,
without citation or support, that “revenue bonds secured by newly acquired
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granted to GO bondholders (like the ability to compel a
municipality to raise taxes to repay bonds) are as effective as the
property rights afforded by a mortgage (like foreclosure).64 Absent
some special state law to the contrary, GO bondholders can use a
writ of mandamus to force a struggling municipality to repay its
GO debt before it pays municipal employees or pensioners.65
2. Revenue Bonds
Municipalities can grant creditors an interest in one limited
form of municipal property: money.66 They do this by granting
bondholders a lien on an incoming stream of municipal revenue.67
Thus, to “secure” repayment of bonds issued to construct a sewer,
a municipality could grant bondholders a lien on all incoming
sewer fees from the new local sewer system; or, to secure bonds
property are not particularly uncommon.”).
64. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1 (2014) (creating all of the typical GO
bondholder protections, including a full faith and credit pledge, a state mandate
to set aside enough money to pay all principal and interest payments, and a
requirement that an issuing municipality increase its taxes “without limitation
of rate or amount” to guarantee repayment); Flushing Nat. Bank v. Mun.
Assistance Corp., 358 N.E.2d 848, 851–52 (N.Y. 1976) (distinguishing
obligations secured by the “faith and credit” of the municipality from mere
“revenue obligation[s]” and “moral obligation[s]” and implying that the former
are more powerful than the latter); AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38,
§ 5.4.1 (calling the writ of mandamus—a common tool available exclusively to
general bondholders that allows them to mandate tax increases—the “most
effective remedy” for bondholders); id. § 5.4.3, at 246–50 (noting that the remedy
of execution or foreclosure “will not be awarded to enforce a judgment against a
municipal corporation absent a statute to the contrary” and that courts are
unwilling to “dissolve or dismantle municipal corporations in order to satisfy
creditors”); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 431
(1993), 429–33 (noting that execution, a property rights-based remedy is, in
practice, “unavailable to the municipal creditor”).
65. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 5.4.1 (describing the
remedy and its application).
66. See infra note 67 and accompanying text (describing how municipalities
can grant property rights in their revenue streams).
67. See 4 JOHN MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 25:25 & n.21 (noting
that pledges of a tax revenue stream “as security for municipal obligations is
ordinarily viewed as creating a closed, enforceable lien on the fund required to
be created by the agreement between issuer and bondholders” and compiling
dozens of cases in support of the proposition).
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issued to construct a new convention center, a municipality could
grant bondholders a lien on all tax revenues from a special
lodging tax.68
Revenue bonds typically contain this lien-based security
device.69 In a typical revenue bond transaction, the proceeds from
revenue bonds are used to fund the construction or development
of a facility, system, or set of improvements (like the sewer
system or the convention center mentioned above).70 The facility,
system, or set of improvements will then generate a revenue
stream, which is used to repay the principal and interest on the
issuance.71 Because the encumbered revenue stream represents
the only potential source of repayment for revenue bondholders,72
a municipality cannot divert it for other purposes.73
“Conduit financing” is an increasingly popular variant on the
traditional revenue bond transaction.74 Under this structure,
68. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 13 (listing these as examples of typical
revenue streams used to repay revenue bonds).
69. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 4 (1988) (“[R]evenue bonds . . . are
usually backed by and repaid only from the revenues generated from the
physical asset built with the money raised by the bond offering. A lien in favor
of the bondholders exists on this revenue stream, but not on the physical asset
itself.”).
70. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 1.3.2, at 29 (explaining
that revenue bond proceeds are used to finance the construction or operation of
“such revenue-producing capital projects as toll bridges, electrical generating
plants, and water works systems”).
71. See id. (suggesting that such revenues from such systems, once
constructed, serve as the security and repayment source for the bonds).
72. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 9 (“[I]f water revenues are insufficient to
pay operating expenses and the debt service on water revenue bonds, other
funds of the city should not be reachable to pay the bonds.”); AMDURSKY &
GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 1.3.2, at 30 (“[P]rojects constructed with revenuebond proceeds place no additional burden on the taxing power of the issuer and
do not place the issuer’s constituents at financial risk in the event of a project’s
failure . . . .”).
73. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 8 (describing how municipalities will
separate revenue-generating projects into multiple enterprises and that “the
funds derived from one source are often legally unavailable for other enterprises
or for general governmental purposes”).
74. See Gina M. Torielli, Opining on the 501(c)(3) Tax-Free Bond
Transaction: Avoiding Common Borrower’s Counsel Misconceptions, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 147, 153 n.26 (2004) (“These transactions are called ‘conduit’
financings because the governmental issuer of the bonds serves as the conduit
between the bondholder and the ultimate obligor on the debt.”). Bonds issued in
conduit projects involving a public entity and a private entity are sometimes
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municipalities (typically special-purpose entities like building
authorities)75 issue bonds to finance the construction of facilities
that are, in turn, leased to third parties, including other
municipal entities.76 The issuer then grants bondholders some
form of interest in the lease payment revenue stream that the
issuer receives from the third party.77 In a variant of this
structure, the conduit issuer will loan the proceeds of the bond
issuance to a third-party borrower, which will construct the
facility using those proceeds.78 The conduit issuer would secure

referred to as “industrial revenue bonds” or “private activity bonds.” See, e.g.,
AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 1.3.2, at 30–31 (using such labels).
75. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities
in Public Finance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 369, 370–77 (2012) (explaining what special
purpose entities are, what they do, and how states use them to avoid state law
requirements placed on cities and counties); supra note 39 (defining the phrase
“municipality” to include reference to special purpose districts). Though I use
the phrase “municipality” here for consistency, conduit deals are typically
undertaken by special purpose districts designed specifically to issue bonds that
cities and counties cannot issue because of debt restrictions or other state law
limitations.
76. See, e.g., Torielli, supra note 74, at 156 & n.44 (noting that municipal
issuers will frequently create or use existing local entities, like economic
development, public housing authorities, education facility financing
authorities, or health care facility financing authorities to conduct the
transaction); Sean Carey, Note, Post-Davis Conduit Bonds: At the Intersection of
the Dormant Commerce Clause and Municipal Debt, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 121,
153–56 (2009) (describing conduit financing and summarizing the arguments on
both sides of the controversy over whether conduit bond transactions involving
private parties should receive preferential tax treatment).
77. See, e.g., ELMORE CNTY. PUB. BLDG. AUTH., BUILDING REVENUE
WARRANTS (DHR Building) 4 (2014) (noting that bondholders are “secured” by
the lease payments made by the lessee—Elmore County, in this case—that will
begin after the building authority completes construction of an office building).
In the direct loan context, bondholders have a lien on the stream of loan
payments made by the municipality. See Torielli, supra note 74, at 155–57
(describing this structure).
78. See Torielli, supra note 74, at 155–56 (describing a typical conduit
transaction involving a 501(c)(3) and a public entity). Critically, even a
transaction structured as a lease could be treated as a loan with a grant of a
security interest in bankruptcy. See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 612–18 (7th Cir. 2005) (analyzing whether a lease
arrangement arising out of a conduit bond transaction was a “true” lease or a
grant of a security interest and concluding that the transaction was a grant of a
security interest).
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these bonds by pledging the debt service payments made by the
third-party borrower.79
Lacking a “full faith and credit” pledge, the only thing that
revenue bondholders can rely upon to guarantee repayment is the
lien on the revenue stream itself.80 Outside of bankruptcy, such
bonds are considered riskier than GO bonds because the sewer
system could fail or the convention center guests could stop
staying in local hotels, leaving bondholders with no revenue to
repay their investment.81 GO bondholders, on the other hand,
could simply demand property tax increases if the municipality
ran short of revenue.82
3. Short-Term Debt Securities
Municipalities use short-term debt, usually styled as “notes”
that mature within a year, to “regulate cash flow or to initiate
capital projects” while waiting to secure more permanent
financing.83 Short-term notes combine certain aspects of GO
bonds and revenue bonds.84 Municipalities will secure some “tax
79. See Torielli, supra note 74, at 155–57 (noting that this is the typical
structure for such transactions).
80. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 1.3.2, at 29 (defining
revenue bonds generally as self-liquidating obligations “payable solely from the
proceeds generated through operations of the facility financed with the bond
proceeds”); MARTINEZ, supra note 67, § 25:25 (suggesting this as the potential
remedy for revenue bondholders and outlining various lien enforcement
mechanisms); supra note 47 and accompanying text (noting that revenue bonds
lack a full faith and credit guarantee).
81. See Tracy Nichols Eddy, The Referendum Requirement: A
Constitutional Limitation on Local Government Debt in Florida, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 677, 700 (1984) (“Because revenue bonds are less secure than general
obligation bonds backed by the issuer’s taxing power, higher interest rates are
necessary to compensate investors for the added risks.” (citations omitted)).
82. See supra notes 44–48, 64–65 and accompanying text (describing GO
bonds, the tax increases they promise, and the enforcement mechanisms they
create).
83. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 1.3.3, at 33; see GELFAND,
supra note 47, §§ 3.29–3.31 (describing tax anticipation notes (TANs) and
revenue anticipation notes (RANs) as devices that “can smooth out and
maintain cash flow” and bond anticipation notes (BANs) as debt “issued to
provide short-term financing for a project during its design and construction
phases”).
84. Compare NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
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anticipation notes” and “revenue anticipation notes” with a
revenue bond-like structure: a “pledge to trap the anticipated
revenues upon their receipt into a specified fund to be applied to
pay the notes.”85 Like revenue bonds, such notes can create a lien
on the bond, revenue, or tax streams pledged for repayment.86 In
other cases, short-term notes are—like GO bonds—payable from
any source within the municipality’s general fund.87 Some shortterm notes are supported by the “full faith and credit” guarantee,
while others are not.88
4. Securing Bonds with Statutory Liens
Thus far, this Part has introduced two mechanisms by which
municipalities provide peace of mind to bondholders: contractual
pledges of “full faith and credit” (in the case of UTGOs, LTGOs,
and some short-term securities)89 and contractual provision of
property rights (in the form of a lien on a revenue stream). 90
There is, however, a third mechanism through which states, not
municipalities, can provide security for all types of municipal
TWENTY YEARS (FINAL REPORT) § 4.3.6 (Oct. 20, 1997) (recommending that
Chapter 9 be altered to treat TANs and RANs as “special revenue” obligations
because they “are similar to special revenues and should receive the same
treatment”), with In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 185, 192 n.17 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1995) (noting that there was “no disagreement” that the TANs in that case
were general obligations because they were pledged from first available
municipal general revenues).
85. GELFAND, supra note 47, § 3.29 (noting that many RANs contain
“trapping” covenants).
86. See Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. at 193–94 (finding that Orange County
created a contractual lien on certain tax revenue anticipation notes at issue in
its bankruptcy); AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 1.3.3, at 33
(maintaining that these bonds “are often secured by a particular revenue stream
and take their name from that source” and listing taxes, revenues, and bonds as
potential repayment sources).
87. See William M. Loafman & Milton S. Wakschlag, Tax-Exempt
Financing, 48 TAX LAW. 1347, 1354 (1995) (noting that a municipality paid bond
anticipation notes out of its general fund).
88. See GELFAND, supra note 47, § 10:17 (“The full-faith-and-credit
guarantee distinguishes general obligation bonds (as well as certain notes
backed by full faith and credit) from revenue bonds (and revenue anticipation
notes), which are backed only by a particular fund or revenue source.”).
89. Supra notes 42–64, 88 and accompanying text.
90. Supra notes 66–82 and accompanying text.
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debt.91 This mechanism is called a “statutory lien,” and is a close
cousin to the “contractual liens” provided by revenue bonds.92
Like contractual liens, statutory liens provide the holders of
certain bonds with property rights to the income stream promised
by the indenture.93 However, statutory liens differ from
contractual liens in two major ways. First, statutory liens arise
by force of state law; they exist outside the terms of the indenture
because they are created automatically by operation of state
statute.94 Second, a state legislature can impress any kind of
municipal debt with a statutory lien.95 While contractual liens
rarely exist outside the revenue bond context, a state could
choose to place a statutory lien on all UTGOs, LTGOs, or even
short-term securities issued by its municipalities.96 Ultimately,
the creation of a lien is a property law issue, and the exact

91. See JAMES E. SPIOTTO ET AL., MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS? HOW STATES
INVESTORS DEAL WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES 57–58
(2012) (indicating that statutory liens can provide GO bondholders with
additional protection in a municipal bankruptcy and that they can only be
created by force of state statute).
92. See id. (defining statutory lien).
93. See id. at 58–59 (noting that statutory liens, like contractual liens
created by revenue bonds, provide property rights that are protected under
bankruptcy law).
94. See id. at 58 (noting that a statutory lien “comes into existence by
virtue of the [state] statute and arises by force of the statute on specific
circumstances or conditions and [does] not requir[e] further action by the
municipality” (citing In re Cnty. of Orange, 189 B.R. 499 (C.D. Cal. 1995))).
Compare In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 185, 192 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995)
(finding that no statutory lien arose where a municipality consented to (and
actually authorized) the granting of a lien), with In re Cnty. of Orange, 189 B.R.
499, 502–03 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (reversing the bankruptcy court and finding that
the statute gave rise to a lien even if the municipality also created a contractual
lien because the “distinguishing feature of a statutory lien is that it arises
‘solely’ by force of a statute,” and the statute clearly granted a lien).
95. See SPIOTTO ET AL, supra note 91, at 58 & n.111 (claiming that “thirtytwo states recognize some form of statutory lien in relation to their bond
obligations” and providing a reference to a chart listing the state statutes that
authorize these provisions).
96. See, e.g., Doty, supra note 49, at 58 (“[O]nly five states provide
statutory liens broadly in support of local general obligation bonds (California,
Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island). . . . A number of states permit
statutory liens for certain types of debt, and others do so conditionally.” (citation
omitted)).
AND
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language that creates a lien will vary significantly from state to
state.97
While this additional layer of protection may seem
unnecessary, especially given the powerful contractual rights
already afforded to holders of GO bonds, the property rights
provided by a statutory lien could make the difference between
full repayment and partial repayment in bankruptcy.98 For
example, the statutory lien that Rhode Island impressed on all
outstanding GO bonds in 2011 guaranteed that Central Falls’ GO
bondholders—who would otherwise have received pennies on the
dollar—were entitled to top priority in bankruptcy.99 Part II.B,
after the Table below, explains why.

97. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests
are created and defined by state law.”); SPIOTTO ET AL, supra note 91, at B1–2
(charting the presence or absence of statutory liens in all 50 states); Caitlin
Devitt, Detroit Judge Hears Challenge To ULTGO Treatment, BOND BUYER (Feb.
19, 2014, 5:39 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/123_34/detroit-judgehears-challenge-to-ultgo-treatment-1060015-1.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015)
(discussing how several municipal bond rating agencies are currently surveying
laws in all fifty states to determine which states grant contractual liens and on
which revenues they grant them) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
98. See Corkery, supra note 4 (describing how the statutory lien impressed
on GO bonds by Rhode Island ensured that GO bondholders received full
repayment in Central Falls’ bankruptcy).
99. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1 (2014) (mandating that a municipality’s
promise of full faith and credit “shall constitute a first lien on . . . ad valorem
taxes and general fund revenues” pledged for repayment of the bonds); Corkery,
supra note 4 (recounting the details of the Central Falls bankruptcy
proceedings).
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5. Summarizing Pre-Bankruptcy Expectations
Table 1: Rights and Remedies Available to Bondholders
Pre-Bankruptcy100

Bond Type
Unlimited Tax
General
Obligation

Limited Tax
General
Obligation

Collateralized
General Fund

Uncollateralized
General Fund

Project-Based
Revenue

Payment Stream
An unlimited amount of a
certain type of tax revenue,
typically ad valorem taxes
(plus any other revenues
necessary if property tax
revenues are insufficient).
A certain type of tax revenue,
typically ad valorem taxes,
limited by rate or amount
(plus, in some cases, other
revenues up to a certain
point).
Periodic lease payments or
other allocations made directly
from
the
municipality’s
general fund by its elected
officials.
Periodic
allocations
made
directly
from
the
municipality’s general fund by
its elected officials.

Means of Guaranteeing Repayment
Contractual rights: mandating municipal
tax increases or payments from other
revenue sources.
Property rights: typically none, unless the
state has imposed a statutory lien.

Receivables, like sewer fees or
tolls,
generated
by
the
financed project or tax revenue
correlated with the success of
the project.

Contractual rights: mandating rate or fee
increases to pay for the financed
system.101
Property rights: lien on the underlying
revenue stream.

Contractual Rights: mandating tax
increases up to a certain extent or
(potentially) payment from other limited
sources.
Property Rights: typically none, unless
the state has imposed a statutory lien.
Contractual rights: no right to increase
taxes; other limited rights may be
available.
Property rights: undivided fractional
interest in underlying lease
Contractual rights: no right to increase
taxes; other limited rights may be
available.
Property rights: typically none, unless the
state has imposed a statutory lien.

100. Any information not directly derived from the text of Part II.A is
referenced with a footnote.
101. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 5.4.2, at 246–50 (describing
this remedy).
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Conduit-Based
Revenue102

Payments from the third-party Contractual rights: acceleration under
beneficiaries of the bonds.
default; other remedies vary from
contract to contract.
Property rights: lien on the underlying
revenue stream
Aid/Transfer
Transfer
payments
from Contractual rights: typically none, but
Revenue103
another governmental entity specific terms of issuance may vary this
or a third party that did not rule.
benefit
from
the
bond Property rights: lien on the underlying
issuance.
revenue stream
Bond
Proceeds from an anticipated Contractual rights: varies from issuance
Anticipation
bond issue.104
to issuance.
Notes
Property rights: sometimes granted in
form of a lien.
Revenue
Proceeds from the anticipated Contractual rights: varies from issuance
Anticipation
receipt of non-tax payments, to issuance.
Notes
like
rents,
charges,
or Property rights: sometimes granted in
intergovernmental aid.105
form of a lien.
Tax Anticipation Proceeds from future receipts Contractual rights: varies from issuance
Notes
of specified state or local tax to issuance.
revenue.106
Property rights: sometimes granted in
form of a lien.

B. Reversing Expectations: The Mechanics of the Bond Market
Post-Bankruptcy
Part II.A discussed the two primary mechanisms by which
municipalities can guarantee repayment of debt: contractual
rights (typically associated with GO bonds) and property rights
(in the form of statutory and contractual liens). Outside
bankruptcy, or “prepetition,” contractual rights afford the same—
102. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text (explaining conduit
revenue bonds). This category includes pollution control, private activity,
501(c)(3) conduit issuance, or any other situation in which a third-party
beneficiary receives the proceeds of the issuance.
103. I use this as short-hand for revenue bonds that are neither projectbased nor conduit transactions. In these transactions, the third party—typically
a state, federal, or local entity—is not the beneficiary of the bond proceeds, but
provides the revenue stream used to repay bondholders.
104. GELFAND, supra note 47, § 10:22 (“BANs are backed by the anticipated
revenues from approved bond issues.”).
105. Id. (“RANs are issued in anticipation of state or local government
revenues other than real estate taxes, e.g., sales taxes, rents, charges, and
intergovernmental aid.”).
106. Id. (“TANs are issued in anticipation of the receipt of certain state or
local taxes, usually real estate taxes, from the current or recent fiscal year(s).”).
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and perhaps greater—protections that property rights do.107 After
the filing of a bankruptcy petition, or “postpetition,” the
Bankruptcy Code reverses these market expectations for the
reasons explored below.
1. Impairing Contractual Rights
The principal goal of the Bankruptcy Code is the “adjustment
of the debtor-creditor relationship.”108 To that end, the
Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution109
“necessarily authorizes Congress to make laws that would impair
contracts.”110 Though bankruptcy law “endeavors to provide a
system of orderly, predictable rules for treatment of parties
whose contracts are impaired, that does not change the starring
role of contract impairment in bankruptcy.”111
This notion of contract impairment is critical in municipal
bankruptcy because every bond transaction is predicated on a set
of contractual documents, collectively referred to as an
“indenture.”112 The indenture creates a series of contractual
rights; it delineates how bondholders will be repaid, how much
they will be repaid, and how they can compel payment if the
municipality defaults on its obligations.113 It also establishes a
single fund or a series of funds into which the municipality
107. See supra notes 43–82 and accompanying text (describing the
contractual and property rights that secure general obligation and revenue
bonds and noting the market preference for the former over the latter).
108. In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 25 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
110. City of Stockton, 478 B.R. at 15 (noting that “[i]t long has been
understood that bankruptcy law entails impairment of contracts” and citing
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 191 (1819)).
111. Id.
112. See infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text (discussing the
elements of a typical bond indenture and how they drive the structure of the
transaction).
113. See, e.g., Charles L. Jarik et al., Municipal Financial Distress: A Case
Study of a Partnership Between the Village of Maywood and the Illinois
Development Finance Authority, 25 URB. LAW. 995, 1007–09 (1993) (describing
an indenture that specified how a local authority would trap tax revenues from
a nearby village, apply those revenues towards various funds set up by the
indenture, and pay bondholders given amounts of debt service at given times).
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transfers revenues that will ultimately be used to repay
bondholders.114
The filing of a Chapter 9 petition does not automatically
eliminate or annul an indenture; the payment fund structures,
the principal and interest payment amounts, and the default
remedies specified in the indenture technically survive.115

114. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Jefferson Cnty. (In re Jefferson Cnty.), 482
B.R. 404, 415–19 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012) (describing a “waterfall” fund
structure where collected sewer revenues went to pay the operating expenses of
the sewer, then flowed into a debt service fund to repay bondholders, then
flowed into a reserve fund to cover capital expenditures and depreciation).
Where bonds are payable from a specific tax levy, the mechanism can be quite
simple. See, e.g., GELFAND, supra note 47, § 3.29 (noting that many tax
anticipation notes, a form of short-term debt, contain simple “trapping”
covenants that pledge to trap the revenue securing the notes in a given fund
dedicated to bondholder repayment as soon as the municipality acquires the
funds). The indenture typically instructs the municipality to collect the tax each
month and deposit it into a special account, usually called a “debt service fund,”
to which only one individual—a fiduciary of the bondholders called an
“indenture trustee”—has access. See Jarik et al., supra note 113, at 1002, 1007–
08 (describing such an indenture and noting that the bond trustee receives all
payments of principal and interest and manages them on behalf of the
bondholders). In the case of project funding with revenue bonds, the indenture
will often establish a more elaborate payment structure because the same
stream of revenue used to repay bondholders must also pay for the operating
expenses of the project or system. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 482 B.R. at 415–19
(describing how the indenture mandated payment of operating expenses before
any revenue flowed through to bondholders under its “waterfall” payment
system).
115. See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57
MINN. L. REV. 439, 451–57 (1973) (noting that a debtor can only reject executory
contracts and establishing a test to determine whether a given contract is
executory); Richard M. Cieri, Barbara J. Oyer & Dorothy J. Birnbryer, “The
Long and Winding Road”: The Standards to Confirm A Plan of Reorganization
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Part I), 3 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3, 23
n.103 (1993) (applying Countryman’s test and suggesting that an indenture may
not be an executory contract because the bondholders have fully performed by
paying for their bonds while the municipality performed only partially because
it has not yet repaid the bondholders). The authors of the latter article are
careful to note that the issue of “[w]hether debt indentures may be rejected
under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code continues to be unresolved.” Cieri,
Oyer & Birnbryer, supra. Absent rejection, nothing about the filing of a
bankruptcy petition automatically terminates contractual obligations; it merely
renders them unenforceable. See infra notes 118–134 and accompanying text
(describing the effects of the automatic stay and the presumption that the filing
of a bankruptcy petition does not destroy the payment structure established by
the indenture).
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However, bankruptcy law can impair and even invalidate any of
the contractual rights contained in the indenture.116
While dozens of Bankruptcy Code provisions could
potentially impair a bondholder’s contractual rights, two sections
are particularly relevant.117 The first is the “automatic stay”
contained in § 362.118 The second is the plan confirmation and
“cramdown” process, which is discussed in Part II.B.2.
Immediately after a municipality files a Chapter 9 petition,
§ 362 prevents bondholders from taking any action to “obtain
possession” or “exercise control over” the municipality’s property
or “recover claims” against the municipality.119 Technically, the
automatic stay bans everything from compelling a tax increase
with a writ of mandamus120 to “self-help,” which involves the
bond trustee taking money already in her possession and using it
to repay bondholders.121
This stay represents a broad barrier to creditor action
against a municipality.122 For example, if Central Falls had
stopped paying its GO bondholders a month after it filed for
116. See infra notes 118–134 and accompanying text (describing how the
automatic stay contained in Section 362(a) effectively renders the indenture
unenforceable).
117. See infra notes 118–134 and accompanying text (explaining how these
provisions impact contractual rights and why they are so significant to
bondholders).
118. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012); see infra notes 119–134 and accompanying
text (describing the automatic stay).
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (creating an automatic stay that prevents almost
all action against the debtor to enforce any contractual rights that could be used
to compel repayment); 11 U.S.C. § 901 (incorporating § 362 into Chapter 9 by
reference); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011) [hereinafter COLLIER] (noting that the automatic
stay prevents both secured and unsecured claimants from taking any action to
“enforce or collect prepetition claims”).
120. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (barring creditors from “commenc[ing]” any
“judicial” proceeding, like a writ action).
121. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 119, ¶ 922.05[2] (discussing this remedy and
noting that, absent § 922(d), it would be unavailable to secured bondholders in
municipal bankruptcy).
122. See, e.g., S. REP. 100-506, at 11 (1988) (“The automatic stay of
Bankruptcy Code Section 362 is extremely broad, preventing any post-petition
collection activities against the debtor . . . . This provision is overly broad in
Chapter 9, requiring the delay and expense arising from a request for relief from
the automatic stay to accomplish what many state statut[]es mandate . . . .”).
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Chapter 9, § 362(a) would have prevented bondholders from
walking into state court and enforcing their “full faith and credit”
pledge.123 Indeed, it would have even prevented GO bondholders
from being paid out of funds sitting in an account reserved for
their exclusive use.124
2. Impairing Property Rights
Nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from using
bankruptcy law to alter contractual rights.125 However, the
uneasy relationship between the Bankruptcy Clause and the
Takings Clause126 has led Congress to inscribe a respect for
claims based on property rights into the Bankruptcy Code.127 The
Code generally requires that any creditor with property rights
(which are referred to as “liens” throughout much of the Code)128
must either be allowed to retain the lien after a bankruptcy
discharge or receive “just compensation” if the bankruptcy
process impairs or destroys the lien.129 Thus, lienholders have

123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (explaining why writs of
mandamus and other actions to secure are ineffective against the automatic
stay).
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (describing how and why a
bond trustee cannot take monies paid into a specially designated fund and
distribute them to the bondholders).
125. See, e.g., In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 15 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012)
(“Significantly, the [Constitution] bans a state from making a law impairing the
obligation of contract; it does not ban Congress from making a law impairing the
obligation of contract. This asymmetry is no accident.”).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”).
127. See James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights
in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment
and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 977–97 (1983) (describing the
proposition that “any impairment of the liquidation value of a secured creditor’s
collateral attributable to the exercise of powers conferred on the reorganization
court by bankruptcy legislation is, in the absence of just compensation, a
violation of the takings clause of the fifth amendment”).
128. The Code defines a “lien” as any “charge against or interest in property
to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(37)
(2012).
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012) (providing that any allowed claim
“secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest” is a “secured
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“secured” claims because the Code guarantees that they will
receive at least the value of their property interest in the plan of
adjustment that concludes a Chapter 9 proceeding.130
Claimants without liens—like most GO bondholders and
short-term note holders—have no property rights to protect in
bankruptcy, rendering them “unsecured” claimants.131 No portion
of the Bankruptcy Code requires municipalities to pay unsecured
claimants the full value of their claims.132 Indeed, Chapter 9
grants municipalities the exclusive right to propose a plan of
adjustment that pays unsecured bondholders only a fraction of
what they are owed under the terms of the indenture.133 Though
all creditors have the opportunity to approve or reject the
claim”); 11 U.S.C. § 901 (incorporating §§ 506 and 1129(b)(2)(A) into Chapter 9);
id. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (mandating that any plan of adjustment permit secured
claimholders to retain their liens and receive deferred cash payments equal to
the value of their lien or receive the “indubitable equivalent” of their claims).
Note that “the estate” is “the debtor” in Chapter 9. See id. § 902 (defining
“property of the estate” as “property of the debtor” in the Chapter 9 context).
130. See MARGARET HOWARD, BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 176 (5th
ed. 2012) (“Holders of secured claims have a legally recognized property interest
in collateral of the debtor . . . .”); id. at 284 (noting that “[o]ne of bankruptcy’s
fundamental policy decisions is that property rights created under
nonbankruptcy law will be respected in bankruptcy[,]” but that “the value of a
secured creditor’s rights is respected rather than the in rem rights themselves”);
sources cited supra note 129 (listing the Bankruptcy Code mechanisms designed
to ensure that secured claimants receive the value of their property interest,
even if paid out over time). A “plan of adjustment” is the Chapter 9 phrase for a
“plan of reorganization.” See 11 U.S.C. § 941 (requiring debtors to file a plan of
adjustment as opposed to a plan of reorganization).
131. See HOWARD, supra note 130, at 176 (noting that unsecured creditors
“have no property interests to support the debtor’s obligation”).
132. See, e.g., David S. Kupetz, Municipal Debt Adjustment Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 27 URB. LAW. 531, 595 (1995) (maintaining that unsecured
municipal creditors should only receive what the court believes they “could
reasonably expect under the circumstances” and implying that this amount can
be less than the face value of their claims).
133. See 11 U.S.C. § 941 (providing the municipality with the exclusive right
to propose and file a plan of adjustment); id. § 1129(b) (establishing the absolute
priority rule, which permits a municipality to “cram down” a plan of adjustment
on unwilling unsecured creditors). A thorough discussion of the cramdown
provision, the absolute priority rule, and the overall standards for confirming a
plan of adjustment over the objections of certain creditors is well beyond the
scope of this Note. For a more complete discussion of these issues, see David S.
Kupetz, Standards for Confirming a Chapter 9 Plan of Debt Adjustment:
Incorporating and Diverging from Chapter 11 Plan Standards, 32 CAL. BANKR.
J. 289 (2012), which contains a treatise-like analysis of plan confirmation.
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proposed plan of adjustments, a bankruptcy court still can
confirm a plan over the objections of a group of unsecured
bondholders.134 In effect, this allows the bankruptcy court to force
unsecured bondholders to accept pennies on the dollar in
satisfaction of their claims.135
In sum, the first key to bondholder treatment in municipal
bankruptcy is the presence or absence of property rights to
municipal revenue.136 However, to complicate matters further,
the Bankruptcy Code does not respect all property rights
equally.137 While the general bankruptcy policy of respecting
property rights in bankruptcy holds true in most contexts, there
are certain exceptions.138 One of these exceptions is for contracts
that place a lien on a debtor’s future income.139
This future-income exception is grounded in the “fresh start”
policy first articulated in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.140 In Local
134. See, e.g., Zack A. Clement & R. Andrew Black, How City Finances Can
Be Restructured: Learning from Both Bankruptcy and Contract Impairment
Cases, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 41, 52 (2014) (“Creditors have the opportunity to vote
to approve or reject a proposed chapter 9 plan. If one or more of the classes of
creditors vote to reject the plan, the plan can still be confirmed if it satisfies the
cram down provisions of chapter 11 that are made applicable in chapter 9
cases.” (citations omitted)).
135. See, e.g., In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 451, 457–59 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1999) (employing the cramdown provision in § 1129(b)(2)(B) on a class
of unsecured creditors who rejected the plan of adjustment because they only
received 50% of their allowed claims over a fifteen year period).
136. Compare supra notes 128–130 and accompanying text (describing the
entitlement to full repayment enjoyed by bondholders with a lien on a municipal
revenue stream), with supra notes 131–135 (describing the drawbacks of the
unsecured status afforded to bondholders without property rights to municipal
revenues).
137. See infra notes 138–153 and accompanying text (demonstrating several
instances in which certain property rights are either impaired temporarily or
permanently).
138. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 127, at 992–93 (noting that §§ 361–364 of
the Code permit the bankruptcy judge to terminate a secured creditor’s lien
against an asset, provided that the secured creditor receives a lien against
different property of equal value in exchange).
139. See infra notes 140–154 and accompanying text (describing § 552).
140. 292 U.S. 234 (1934). In Local Loan, a debtor assigned his future wages
to a bank as security for a loan. See id. at 238 (“[R]espondent borrowed from
petitioner the sum of $300, and as security for its payment executed an
assignment of a portion of his wages thereafter to be earned.”). After the debtor
received his discharge, the bank brought suit to enforce the assignment, arguing
that the assignment was a lien and that such property rights survive the filing
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Loan, the Court explained that “[o]ne of the primary purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act is to ‘relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh
free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes.’”141 Subsequent courts have found that the
centrality of this policy to the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code
justify any potential Fifth Amendment concerns.142
Section 552(a)143 codifies the “fresh start” goal articulated in
Local Loan.144 Its primary application is in business bankruptcy.
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),145
lenders can secure their loans by placing a lien on all “existing
and after-acquired” inventory and equipment of the debtor.146
of a bankruptcy. See id. at 238–39 (outlining the procedural history of the case
and the arguments made by both parties). The Court ultimately held that future
earnings are not “property” under bankruptcy law until they are actually
earned. See id. at 243 (“The earning power of an individual is the power to
create property; but it is not translated into property within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act until it has brought earnings into existence.”). Any lien not
“arising from, or connected with, preexisting property” should not receive its full
value in bankruptcy. Id. (maintaining that bankruptcy will only respect liens
“existent when the bankruptcy became effective or . . . arising from, or
connected with, preexisting property,” not promises predicated on “the fruit of
the subsequent labor of the bankrupt”).
141. See id. at 245 (citation omitted).
142. See In re Hamilton, 18 B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) (justifying
the termination of a lien on property acquired after the petition by noting that
the creditor’s rights to that property were not vested at the time the bankruptcy
was filed, meaning that they were still contractual in nature and could be
abridged without concern for the Fifth Amendment).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012).
144. See In re Nielsen, 48 B.R. 274, 276 (D.N.D. 1984) (“The purpose of
[section 552(a)] is to facilitate a debtor’s “fresh start” by enabling him or her to
use after-acquired property free and clear of prebankruptcy liens.”); In re Patio
& Porch Sys., Inc., 194 B.R. 569, 573 (Bankr. D. Md. 1996) (“The purpose of
[Section 552(a)] is to further the ‘fresh start’ goals of the Bankruptcy Code by
not allowing prepetition liens to encumber property acquired by the debtor
postpetition.”); In re Texas Tri-Collar, Inc., 29 B.R. 724, 727 (Bankr. W.D. La.
1983) (“An order allowing a prepetition security interest to extend to property
acquired by the debtor after commencement of the case would be in
contravention of section 552(a) and its goal of bolstering the debtor’s fresh
start.”).
145. U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to -709 (2014).
146. See U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a
security agreement may create or provide for a security interest in afteracquired collateral.”); LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPUNICK, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 75 (3d ed. 2010) (providing an example of
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Such a provision gives the lender a perfected security interest in
everything the debtor currently has in its warehouse and any
inventory it receives in the future.147 These “after-acquired
property” clauses are typically not the only source of security for
business loans; rather, they are part of an overall package
whereby the bank perfects security interests in as much of the
debtor’s real and personal property as possible.148 In corporate
bankruptcy, § 552(a) terminates these “floating liens,” but allows
creditors to retain their security interest in any proceeds relating
to the sale of inventory or equipment that was in the debtor’s
possession before the petition date.149
Like Local Loan, § 552(a) only covers liens “resulting from
any security agreement,”150 meaning that it only terminates
contractual liens and leaves statutory liens intact.151 This is why
GO bondholders in Rhode Island could breathe easy after the
General Assembly created their statutory lien; they knew that
they would be secured creditors because § 552(a) would have no
effect on their lien.152 For contractual liens, however, § 552(a)
a transaction involving an after-acquired property clause).
147. See RUSCH & SEPUNICK, supra note 146, at 75 (explaining that this is
how after-acquired property clauses work in commercial transactions).
148. See id. at 75–76 (advising attorneys to draft the language creating the
security interest as broadly as possible to include both existing and afteracquired property).
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (noting that property acquired “after the
commencement of the case is not subject to any lien” that arose prepetition but
allowing creditors to retain security interests in “proceeds, products, offspring,
or profits” of the collateral); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 412–13 (1993)
(confirming this application of § 552 and providing examples).
150. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a); see id. § 901 (making § 552(a) applicable in Chapter
9); see also id. § 101(50) (“The term ‘security agreement’ means agreement that
creates or provides for a security interest.”); id. § 101(51) (“The term ‘security
interest’ means lien created by an agreement.”).
151. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (terminating all liens on property acquired after
the petition date); SPIOTTO ET AL., supra note 91, at 58, 61–62 (noting that a
“statutory lien cannot be canceled on the filing of a bankruptcy petition or by the
bankruptcy court,” but that liens terminated by § 552(a) “would not continue
postpetition”); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 412 (1993) (“[S]ection
552(a) applies only to consensual liens, not judicial or statutory liens.” (citation
omitted)).
152. See SPIOTTO ET AL., supra note 91, at 60–61 (giving examples of
statutory liens in favor of bondholders and discussing why they provide such
powerful protection).
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would, absent congressional intervention, terminate the
bondholders’ lien on a future municipal revenue stream—the
exact (and only) source of security granted to revenue
bondholders.153 Revenue bondholders in this position would have
a secured claim for any principal and interest payments due (but
not yet paid) prepetition; they would then have an unsecured
claim for the remaining amount due.154
The rationale for applying this provision in the municipal
context is far weaker than it is in the corporate context.155
Municipalities cannot grant the same kinds of security interests
in real or personal property that businesses can.156 In the
municipal context, a lien on an existing revenue stream does not
supplement other security interests; it is the security interest.157
Removing that otherwise valid and enforceable lien would deny
bondholders the “benefit of their bargain.”158 Worse, it could make
underwriters reticent about buying bonds backed by contractual
liens because of their concerns over the lack of security provided
by bankruptcy law.159 This would effectively cut off municipal
153. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 6 (1988) (stating that, by virtue of § 552, any
prepetition “pledge is terminated” upon the filing of a municipal bankruptcy and
that this problem particularly affects revenue bondholders). Though § 552(b)
creates an exception to the rule in § 552(a) for “proceeds” of prepetition property,
at least one bankruptcy court has held that future tax revenues are not
“proceeds” of any prepetition municipal property. See In re Cnty. of Orange, 179
B.R. 185, 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
154. See SPIOTTO ET AL., supra note 91, at 61 (“After giving value to the
prepetition lien on property or proceeds, there is an unsecured claim to the
extent there is recourse to the municipality or the debtor.”).
155. See infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text (explaining this
assertion).
156. See supra note 62–63 and accompanying text (noting the legal and
policy reasons why states cannot mortgage their municipal property).
157. See supra notes 66–82 and accompanying text (describing revenue
bonds and explaining how the revenue stream lien is the primary source of
security for that type of debt).
158. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12.
159. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 5 (1988) (“Lenders may be reluctant to
advance funds for projects, particularly in municipalities that are having some
financial difficulties, when the possibility exists that the lien securing
repayment could be avoided if the municipality files bankruptcy. Proponents
argue that bond rating agencies may downgrade the creditworthiness
of . . . bonds . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 4 (noting that this exact concern was
what prevented lenders from providing cash-strapped Cleveland with muchneeded liquidity during its financial crisis in the 1970s).
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access to credit markets.160 Fortunately for revenue bondholders,
Congress recognized the failure of § 552(a) in the municipal
context, and tried to solve the problem by taking the steps
described in the next Section.
3. Lien Survival and the 1988 Amendments
Two instances of municipal distress brought the § 552(a)
problem to a head.161 In 1979, creditors cited the concerns caused
by § 552(a) when they refused to extend further credit to
Cleveland, which was under serious financial stress at the
time.162 In 1983, the San Jose Unified School District (SJUSD)
filed for bankruptcy because it was unable to resolve protracted
labor dispute with its teachers.163 Though § 552(a) “terminate[d]
the lien of pre-petition revenue bondholders, . . . San Jose
continued post-petition to make payments to these bondholders in
the same manner as if no bankruptcy has been filed.”164 San Jose
“ignored the federal law” for two reasons: first, it felt legally
bound by the California Constitution to continue making its bond
payments; and, second, a total default would “cause[] irreversible
harm to the school district’s ability to issue debt for any other
public purpose.”165

160. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 4 (noting that the amendments
eliminate lender reticence about “advanc[ing] funds for projects . . . when the
possibility exists that the lien securing repayment could be avoided if the
municipality files bankruptcy”); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 6, 13 (suggesting that it
is important to guarantee “the debtor’s continued access to credit markets” by
ensuring that ratings agencies do not “downgrade the creditworthiness of
certain special revenue bonds” based upon negative perceptions of creditor
rights in municipal bankruptcy).
161. Infra notes 162–165.
162. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 4 (providing a general overview of
Cleveland’s financial situation and suggesting that “lenders who contemplated
providing financing during the financial troubles of the city were discouraged
given the concern that their security interests might terminate upon a Chapter
9 filing by the city”).
163. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-1011, at 3 (1988) (describing the “bitter labor
negotiations” that resulted in San Jose’s bankruptcy filing, in which the “vast
majority of creditors were individual teachers”).
164. Id.
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In 1988, Congress addressed the problems raised by
Cleveland and San Jose with the passage of the Municipal
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1988 (the 1988 Amendments).166
Among other things, they addressed three major concerns with
the 1978 incorporation of corporate bankruptcy principles into
Chapter 9: (a) contractual lien termination and the § 552(a)
problem,167 (b) the continuation of bondholder payments despite
the automatic stay in § 362(a),168 and (c) the potential conversion
of revenue-backed non-recourse obligations into general
obligations.169
a. Contractual Lien Survival and the § 552(a) Problem
Given the precarious position of bondholders in the
Cleveland and San Jose defaults, Congress made resolving the
§ 552(a) contractual lien termination problem the focus of the
1988 Amendments.170 Congress added § 928(a)171 to Chapter 9 as
a direct response to the § 552(a) problem.172 Congress designed
§ 928(a) to ensure that creditors backed by contractual liens
retained “unimpaired rights to the project revenue pledged to
them.”173 Acknowledging the practical realities of municipal
finance, the Senate Report maintained that § 928(a) “amounts to
a recognition of a hypothetical mortgage from which revenues are
derived where a real mortgage cannot be created either for legal
reasons or because of compelling considerations of public
policy.”174

166. Pub. L. No. 100-597, 102 Stat. 3028 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 902–946).
167. Infra Part II.B.3(a).
168. Infra Part II.B.3(b).
169. Infra Part II.B.3(c).
170. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 4 (1988) (indicating that the “main
problem” leading to the enactment of the amendments was the § 552(a) issue).
171. 11 U.S.C. § 928(a) (2012).
172. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 7–8 (noting that § 928(a) is “key to the bill”
because it reverses the effects of § 552(a)); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12–13 (1988)
(maintaining that § 928(a) is intended to directly reverse the effects of § 552(a)).
173. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12.
174. Id. at 13.
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Section 928 states that: “[n]otwithstanding section 552(a) of
this title . . . , special revenues acquired by the debtor after the
commencement of the case shall remain subject to any lien
resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor
before the commencement of the case.”175 The ultimate
application of § 928(a) is clear from the legislative history: if a
bondholder has a contractual lien on a special revenue stream,
then § 928(a) prevents § 552(a) from terminating the lien, and the
bondholder has a fully secured claim.176 However, if a bondholder
has a contractual lien on a revenue stream that does not qualify
as “special revenues,” then § 928(a) does not apply, and § 552(a)
terminates the lien.177 If a bondholder has a statutory lien, of
course, § 928(a) is irrelevant because § 552(a) will not terminate
his lien in the first place.178
Two key phrases in § 928(a) dictate whether it applies:
(1) whether a “security agreement” created the lien—in other
words, whether the lien is contractual;179 and (2) whether that
175. 11 U.S.C. § 928(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
176. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-1011, at 7–8 (“[Section 928(a)] states that a lien
on special revenues acquired by the debtor after the commencement of the case
cannot be avoided under Bankruptcy Code section 552(a); the lien is still valid
post-petition.”); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12 (“New Section 92[8] . . . protects the
lien on revenues.”).
177. See SPIOTTO ET AL., supra note 91, at 61 (concluding that bondholders
have a secured claim for any amounts due prepetition, but that they have an
unsecured claim for any remaining amount).
178. See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text (explaining why
§ 552(a) does not terminate statutory liens). Collier on Bankruptcy, a leading
bankruptcy treatise, includes a curious sentence in its description of § 928(a):
“[A] statutory lien or judicial lien on after acquired assets will be terminated as
to property acquired after the petition date,” noting that § 928(a) does not save
such liens. 6 COLLIER, supra note 119, ¶ 928.02. Collier is correct that § 928(a)
does not save such liens, but this is because it was never intended to do so; it
was only intended to reverse the effects of § 552(a), which only terminates
contractual liens. See supra notes 171–177 and accompanying text (explaining
why this is the case). Collier appears to be incorrect in its assertion that
statutory liens are terminated as to property acquired after the petition date.
See supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text (citing several sources in
unanimous support of the proposition that a bankruptcy petition does not
terminate a statutory lien on property acquired postpetition).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 928(a) (2012); see also id. § 101(50) (“The term ‘security
agreement’ means agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.”);
id. § 101((51) (“The term ‘security interest’ means [a] lien created by an
agreement.”). Such “agreements” are contractual in nature.
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contractual lien is on a “special revenue” stream.180 The first
question is a matter of contractual interpretation.181 The second
is dictated by the definition of “special revenues,” which appears
in § 902(2) and is discussed at length in Parts III and IV.
b. Continued Bondholder Payments and the Automatic Stay
Problem
In drafting the 1988 Amendments, Congress expressed
frustration with the idea that revenue bondholders could have
their payments delayed indefinitely by a bankrupt
municipality.182 Newly drafted § 928(a) mandated that all
bondholders with contractual liens backed by “special revenues”
would retain those liens (and the corresponding payments to
which they were entitled by those liens) in bankruptcy.183
Knowing that it would likely have to pay bondholders the full
amount due under the terms of the indenture, a willing
municipality could agree to continue to pay principal and interest
to § 928(a)-secured bondholders throughout the pendency of the
bankruptcy.184 However, under the automatic stay in § 362,
bondholders could not sue to compel a municipality that was
unwilling to make principal and interest payments during the
pendency of the bankruptcy.185
180. 11 U.S.C. § 928(a).
181. See, e.g., In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 185, 192–95 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1995) (providing an excellent and thorough example of how to perform the kind
of contractual interpretation on a bond indenture that determines whether both
parties intended to create a lien, including citations to relevant authority and
statutes).
182. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 21 (1988) (suggesting that, where a “pledge
of revenues” survives under Section 928, “it would be needlessly disruptive to
financial markets for the effectuation of the pledge to be frustrated by an
automatic stay”).
183. See id. at 21, 22–23 (explaining the application of § 928).
184. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 3–4 (1988) (discussing the situation in
San Jose’s municipal bankruptcy, where the debtor allowed its bondholders to
retain their liens and continued to pay them throughout the bankruptcy in order
to retain access to the credit markets); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 6 (same).
185. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 11 (explaining that § 362 is too broad in the
municipal financing context and that it prevents creditors from claiming what is
rightfully theirs under the terms of the indenture and state statutes mandating
payment).
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According to the Senate Report, this application of the
automatic stay “is overly broad in Chapter 9, requiring the delay
and expense arising from a request for relief from the automatic
stay to accomplish what many state statutues [sic] mandate: the
application of pledged revenues . . . to the payment of secured
bonds.”186 Noting that “[r]easonable assurance of timely payment
is essential to the orderly marketing of municipal bonds and
notes and continued municipal financing,” Congress enacted
§ 922(d) to fix the automatic stay problem.187 This provision
states that any petition filed under Chapter 9 “does not operate
as a stay of application of pledged special revenues in a manner
consistent with section 92[8] . . . to payment of indebtedness
secured by such revenues.”188
The ponderous wording of this provision has led to some
litigation over its exact meaning.189 However, recent case law
from the Jefferson County bankruptcy suggests that because the
1988 Amendments “were designed to retain in a bankruptcy case
how special revenue financing had been structured outside a
186. Id. at 11.
187. Id. at 21.
188. 11 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2012) (emphasis added). The actual text of the
statute cross-references § 927, but this is a drafting error most likely resulting
from the differently numbered provisions in the Senate draft of the bill. See
generally S. REP. NO. 100-506 (referring to § 928 as § 927); Amdursky, supra
note 39, at 12–13 (1990) (noting the error and correcting it to a cross reference
to § 928).
189. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 119, ¶ 922.05[2] (noting that the Code does
not define “pledged” or “application”). Because the Code lacks definitions for
“application” and “pledged,” Collier opines that Congress only intended to
exempt creditors from engaging in “the self-help remedy of ‘application’ of
special revenues in the possession of the secured creditor,” and that the
provision does not require bankrupt municipalities to continue payments during
the pendency of a bankruptcy. Id. In the Jefferson County litigation, the court
disagreed, adopting a broader interpretation. See In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R.
228, 267 n.15 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012), aff’d, No. BR 11-05736-TBB, 2012 WL
3775758 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 2012) (noting disagreement with Collier over a key
portion of the legislative history and suggesting that a “careful reading” of that
portion of the legislative history rebuts Collier’s position). Jefferson County
appealed the ruling to the Eleventh Circuit, but the case was settled and
dismissed before the appellate court could resolve the controversy. See generally
Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant Jefferson Cnty., Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v.
Jefferson Cnty. (In re Jefferson Cnty.), No. 12-13654-BB, 2012 WL 4901391
(11th Cir. Oct. 9, 2012), appeal dismissed (Dec. 26, 2013) (doing so without
issuing a written opinion on the appeal and with prejudice).
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bankruptcy case,”190 Section 922(d) requires municipalities to
keep making post-petition payments in the exact manner
specified by the indenture.191
Like § 928(a), § 922(d) is only activated by the presence of
“special revenues.”192 Unlike § 928(a), however, § 922(d) may
apply to bonds secured by contractual liens or statutory liens.193 A
two-part analysis demonstrates why. First, § 922(d) creates a
stay exception for any application of pledged special revenues to
“indebtedness secured by such revenues.”194 Here, “such revenues”
refers back to “pledged special revenues.” Second, because
“pledged” has a broad meaning in municipal finance, “pledged
special revenues” could refer to any special revenues promised in
the indenture—including special revenues promised without a
corresponding contractual lien, as in the case of a GO bond.195 If a
state then secured these bonds with a statutory lien (as Rhode
Island did), § 922(d) would apply because (1) the bonds are
backed by “pledged” special revenues and (2) the bonds are
“secured” by a statutory lien.196 Thus, whether intentionally or by
190. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Jefferson Cnty. (In re Jefferson Cnty.), 482 B.R.
404, 433 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
191. See In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. at 271 (holding that the “automatic
stays . . . do not apply to the Indenture and warrant required payments of the
Net Revenues” in the hands of the county as of the petition and all future
payments specified in the indenture, even those set to occur “during the
postpetition period”).
192. See 11 U.S.C. § 928(a) (applying its lien survival provision only to
“special revenues acquired by the debtor after the commencement of the case”);
In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. at 271 (applying the stay exception only for
“pledged special revenues”).
193. See infra notes 194–197 and accompanying text (arguing that there is
no textual limitation on the application of Section 922(d) to all secured bonds).
194. 11 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
195. See, e.g., Consolidated Response and Reply Brief of Appellants at 47–
55, Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v. Jefferson Cnty., No. 12-13654-B, 2012 WL
5817088 (11th Cir. Nov. 13, 2012) (compiling dozens of case citations and
scholarly texts in support of the proposition that “pledged” has a broad meaning
in municipal finance and that this was the meaning Congress intended when
drafting the word into § 922(d)); Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms:
Pledged Revenues, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BOARD, http://msrb.org/glossary/
definition/limited-tax-general-obligation-bond.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015)
(defining “pledged” as “[t]he funds obligated for the payment of debt service and
the making of other deposits required by the bond contract”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
196. See supra notes 194–195 and accompanying text (providing the two-
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congressional omission, § 922(d) may apply to bonds backed by
contractual liens and statutory liens on any special revenue
stream.197

part explanation referenced here).
197. See 11 U.S.C. § 928 (referring only to “lien[s] resulting from any
security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the
case” (emphasis added)). As demonstrated by § 928(a), Congress refers to a
“security agreement” when it wants a provision to apply only to contractual
liens. See id. Had Congress wanted to limit § 922(d) to contractual liens, they
would have substituted the phrase “evidenced by the security agreement” for
“secured by such revenues.” Cf. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716,
724 (2011) (arguing that Congress chooses the words it places in the Bankruptcy
Code carefully and uses them to achieve certain results); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543
U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (“[W]e must give effect to every word of a statute wherever
possible.”). This broad reading is supported by the Senate Report, which
evidences a strong intent to continue payment of pledged revenues where state
law otherwise requires it. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 11, 21 (1988).
The counterargument runs as follows: § 922(d) expressly states that the
application of any revenue must be “consistent with Section 92[8],” a section that
deals explicitly with contractual liens and not statutory liens. However, this
cross reference only means that in the case of a lien created by security
agreement where § 928 would otherwise apply, payment of pledged revenues can
still be subordinated under § 928(b). See 11 U.S.C. § 928(b) (mandating that any
lien on special revenues “derived from a project or system shall be subject to the
necessary operating expenses of such project or system”). The most likely reason
for the inclusion of this cross reference was Congress’s concern that, in a certain
subset of revenue bond transactions, creditors might abuse the protections
afforded by the 1988 Amendments. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 11 (1988)
(discussing the misapplication of gross revenue pledges). Some revenue bond
indentures create a “gross revenue” pledge rather than a “net revenue” pledge,
meaning that bondholders get paid before operating expenses get paid. See Bank
of N.Y. Mellon v. Jefferson Cnty. (In re Jefferson Cnty.), 482 B.R. 404, 433–35
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012) (describing these as the primary effects of a gross
revenue pledge versus a net revenue pledge). Congress worried that, where a
sewer system could not generate enough revenue to cover both operating costs
and debt service, gross revenue-backed bondholders would apply all funds
towards debt service, leaving none for the “necessary operating expenses” of the
system. See id. (suggesting that these were Congress’s primary concerns with
allowing continued repayment). The legislative history suggests that, by
including the cross reference, the bankruptcy court would be able to “enjoin
application of proceeds . . . where a secured creditor was about to apply proceeds
of a gross revenue pledge in a matter inconsistent with policies” of the newly
proposed sections of the Code, including § 928(b). S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 11.
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c. Limiting Bondholder Recourse to Other Municipal Assets
In most revenue-bond transactions and short-term debt
sales, and even in certain LTGO deals, the indenture does not
provide the bondholder with recourse against other municipal
assets outside the revenue stream pledged for debt service
payments.198 However, certain provisions in the Bankruptcy
Code, like §§ 552(a) and 1111(b), permit partially secured
bondholders to turn non-recourse claims like these into recourse
claims against all municipal assets, including other revenue
streams not pledged to bondholders in the indenture.199 These
provisions effectively convert limited obligation (or “nonrecourse”) bonds into general obligation (or “recourse”) bonds.200
This contravenes municipal intent to segregate revenues within
the enterprises that generated them.201 In addition, it might
violate state law (making plan confirmation impossible) where
state statutes forbid limited recourse bondholders from satisfying
their claims out of general municipal funds.202
198. See H.R. REP. No. 100-1011, at 4 (“In the event of a default, [special
revenue] bondholders cannot look to any other assets of the municipality for
repayment. Only the income stream generated by the asset or the income
specifically pledged as security by the municipality can be used.”); supra Table 1
(reciting the funding sources for these bonds and describing their limited
recourse nature).
199. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 8–9 (1988) (noting that a “partially secured
bondholder (i.e., one whose lien on revenues is insufficient to pay his bonds), if
he does not have recourse against the debtor for the remainder of his claim
under nonbankruptcy law, will be treated as if he did have recourse” and
explaining why).
200. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 4 (1988) (“Special revenue bonds of a
bankrupt municipality would essentially be turned into general obligation
bonds—but without the authorization by popular vote usually required before a
municipality can issue a general obligation bond.”); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 8
(“[I]f a pledge of future revenues is defeated . . . by [§] 552, . . . the revenue
bonds may be transformed into, in effect, a recourse claim changing the revenue
bonds into a general obligation of the debtor.”).
201. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 8–9 (discussing how municipalities
segregate revenue within the enterprise that generated it, like keeping water
system receipts unavailable for general municipal uses, and that taking revenue
from these enterprises contravenes the intent behind segregating the revenues
in the first place).
202. See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4) (2012) (“The court shall confirm the plan [of
adjustment] if . . . the debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action
necessary to carry out the plan . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 4 (“The effect
of section 552, which could result in general treasury funds being used to repay
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To ensure that special revenue-backed bondholders had no
recourse against the general assets of the municipality, the
drafters added § 927 to “ensure that non-recourse revenue bonds
cannot be converted . . . into recourse, or general obligation[,]
debt.”203 Section 927 provides that the “holder of a claim payable
solely from special revenues of the debtor under applicable
nonbankruptcy law shall not be treated as having recourse
against the debtor.”204 Like § 928(a) and § 922(d), Congress keyed
the applicability of § 927 on the presence of “special revenues.”205
However, Congress made § 927 broader than either of these two
sections.206 Section 928(a) only applies in cases where
bondholders have a contractual lien on special revenues.207
Section 922(d) only applies to municipal debt “secured by” special
revenues—in other words, it only applies when bondholders have
some form of secured claim (contractual or otherwise) on a
municipality’s special revenues.208 Section 927 applies to any
claim—secured or unsecured—payable solely from special
revenues.209
revenue bondholders, would be to defeat this purpose. In some states, it might
even run afoul of state constitutions and statutes if general treasury funds are
used to repay specific revenue bond obligations.”); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 9
(“[T]he transformation of revenue bond (nonrecourse) financing into general
obligation bond (recourse) financing permits municipalities to violate state
statutory and constitutional provisions which in many cases prohibit such
recourse debt (general obligation bonds) above a certain percentage of assessed
value or other limits without voter approval.”).
203. H.R. REP. NO. 101-1011, at 7 (1988).
204. 11 U.S.C. § 927 (emphasis added). Though no case has ever interpreted
this provision, one key portion seems to be the use of the word “solely.”
Technically, under the language of the statute, § 927 would not apply to any
portion of a claim payable from both special revenues and another revenue
source. These bonds, payable from two sources at once, are typically called
“double-barreled” bonds and appear to be insulated from the application of
§ 927. See, e.g., Amdursky, supra note 39, at 8, 15 (noting that
“[d]ouble-barrelled [sic] bonds are backed not only by special revenues but also
by the general credit of the municipality, including its power to levy property
and other taxes” and that § 927 “should not be construed to affect the claim of
holders of double-barrelled [sic] bonds”).
205. See S. REP. NO. 100-506 (“The definition of special revenues is needed
for the purposes of revised Sections 922, 925 and 92[8].”).
206. Infra notes 207–209 and accompanying text.
207. Supra notes 175–180 and accompanying text.
208. Supra notes 192–197 and accompanying text.
209. See 11 U.S.C. § 927 (2012) (failing, in the text of the statute, to
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4. Summarizing the Treatment of Bonds in Bankruptcy
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the treatment of
municipal bonds in bankruptcy is opaque at best. For ease of
reference, Table 2 summarizes the information provided above in
chart form. It demonstrates that favorable treatment for bonds in
municipal bankruptcy hinges on (1) whether those bonds are
backed by some form of statutory or contractual lien, and
(2) whether those bonds are payable from a special revenue
stream. The first question is a matter of contractual
interpretation and state law,210 and it is outside the scope of this
Note. Part III explores the second question.

constrain the term “claim” in any way); id. § 101(5) (defining “claim” as any
“right to payment,” irrespective of whether such right is “secured” or
“unsecured”); 2 COLLIER, supra note 119, at ¶ 101.05[1] (“By fashioning a single
definition of “claim” in the Code, Congress intended to adopt the broadest
available definition of that term.”).
210. See supra notes 97, 181 and accompanying text (describing the kind of
state law statutory exploration and contractual interpretation necessary to
determine the presence of a statutory or a contractual lien).
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Table 2: A Summary of the Effects of Bankruptcy on Municipal Bonds
Bond Type

Statutory Lien

Contractual Lien

No Lien

Payable
from
Special
Revenues

Secured Status: Full
claim secured by § 506(a)
and not bifurcated by
§ 552(a).

Secured Status: Full
claim secured by § 928(a)
(subject to § 928(b)
subordination).

Secured Status:
None—claim is
unsecured under
§ 506(a).

Payment During
Bankruptcy:
Yes—claim payable from
“indebtedness secured by”
special revenues under
§ 922(d).

Payment During
Bankruptcy:
Yes—claim payable from
“indebtedness secured by”
special revenues under
§ 922(d).

Payment During
Bankruptcy:
None—no secured
claim; thus, § 922(d)
does not apply.

Recourse: No—claim
payable from special
revenues; thus, § 927
prevents recourse to other
municipal assets.
Secured Status: Full
claim secured by § 506(a)
and not bifurcated by
§ 552(a).

Recourse: No—claim
payable from special
revenues; thus, § 927
prevents recourse to other
municipal assets.
Secured Status:
Bifurcated by § 552(a) into
secured claim for amounts
due prepetition and
unsecured claim for
amounts due postpetition.

Not
Payable
from
Special
Revenues

Payment During
Bankruptcy:
None—claim not payable
from “indebtedness
secured by” special
revenues under § 922(d).
Recourse: Yes—lacking a
claim payable from special
revenues, § 927 does not
apply, and the
bondholder’s fully secured
claim is payable from any
municipal asset pools.

Payment During
Bankruptcy:
None—no secured claim
postpetition; thus, § 922(d)
does not apply.
Recourse: Yes—lacking a
claim payable from special
revenues, § 927 does not
apply, and both halves of
the bifurcated claim are
payable from any
municipal asset pools.

Recourse: No—
claim payable from
special revenues;
thus, § 927 prevents
recourse to other
municipal assets.
Secured Status:
None—claim is
unsecured under
§ 506(a).
Payment During
Bankruptcy:
None—no secured
claim; thus, § 922(d)
does not apply.
Recourse: Yes—
bondholder is
unsecured and is
entitled to pro-rata
distribution of
municipal assets.
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III. Getting Through the Doorway: Qualifying as “Special
Revenue”
Part II explained that most of the critical new protections
afforded to bondholders under the 1988 Amendments are only
triggered by the presence of “special revenues.”211 However, as
Part III will show, the current definition of “special revenues” in
§ 902(2) does not adequately match the kinds of bonds Congress
intended to protect with the protections afford by §§ 928(a),
922(d), and 927.212 Ultimately, § 902(2) fails to cover the proper
kinds of municipal financing devices; as a result, it must be
broadened.213
A. The Breadth of the Doorway: The Five Categories of Special
Revenue
Section 902(2) creates five categories of “special revenues.”214
Two of these categories cover non-tax receivables,215 while three
cover tax revenue streams.216
1. Non-Tax Receivables
The first category of special revenues covers many, if not
most, of the non-tax receivables used as security for
“traditional” project-financing revenue bonds.217 Under
211. Supra notes 180, 192, 205.
212. Infra Table 3.
213. Infra Part III.A.
214. See 11 U.S.C. § 902(2) (2012) (breaking “special revenues” down into
five categories).
215. Infra Part III.A.1. This Note uses “non-tax receivables” as shorthand
for any kind of municipal revenue not derived from taxation by the municipality
itself.
216. Infra Part III.A.2.
217. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 4 (1988) (noting that the definition of
“special revenues” is intended to protect “revenue bonds,” which “are usually
backed by and repaid only from the revenues generated from the physical asset
built with the money raised by the bond offering”); S. REP. NO. 100-506 (1988)
(noting that the definition of special revenues is intended to capture revenue
bonds, which “are issued to finance projects or programs, and the revenues from
such a project or program are pledged to repay the bond”).
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§ 902(2)(A),218 all “receipts derived from the ownership,
operation, or disposition of projects or systems” that are
“primarily used” to “provide transportation, utility, or other
services” are “special revenues.”219 When broken down into its
constituent parts, § 902(2)(A) sets two criteria on which non-tax
receivables qualify as “special revenues”: (1) municipal
“ownership, operation, or disposition” of the “project or system”
generating the revenues, and (2) that the system be used to
provide a public service.220 Some typical projects or systems that
meet these two criteria include “water, sewage, waste, or electric
systems”221 and “toll highway or bridge or other projects or
systems which impose user fees.”222
Congress only included one other, narrow type of non-tax
receivables in § 902(2).223 Section 902(2)(D)224 defines “other
revenues or receipts derived from particular functions of the
debtor, whether or not the debtor has other functions” as special
revenues.225 Though § 902(2)(D) sounds broad, the House and
Senate Reports suggest that the phrase “particular functions”
includes minor revenue-raising capabilities—like “regulatory fees
and stamp taxes imposed for the recording of deeds”—that should
qualify as special revenues.226
However, these two criteria effectively exclude a number of
very common receivables used as security for revenue bonds. For
instance, state aid used to secure a bond issuance would not
qualify as “special revenues” because such transfer payments
would be non-tax receivables not related to “municipal ownership,
operation, or disposition” of a project.227 Indeed, the wording of
218. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(A).
219. Id.
220. See id. (setting these as the two criteria for qualification under
§ 902(2)(A)).
221. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 6.
222. House Hearing, supra note 62, at 42 (Report of the National
Bankruptcy Conference on Proposed Municipal Bankruptcy Amendments).
223. See infra notes 224–226 and accompanying text (describing the
remainder of the special revenues definition that includes non-tax receivables).
224. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(D) (2012).
225. Id.
226. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 6; S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 21.
227. See, e.g., CITY OF SAN DIEGO TOBACCO SETTLEMENT REVENUE FUNDING
CORP., TOBACCO SETTLEMENT ASSET-BACKED BONDS S-7, 20–21, 25 (2006),
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both these provisions would suggest that any payments made
through a conduit financing transaction may not qualify as
“special revenues.”
In a conduit financing transaction,228 one of two parties could
file for bankruptcy: the conduit issuer or the conduit borrower. If
the conduit issuer files for Chapter 9 protection, the third party
lease or the debt service payments used to secure the bond issue
would derive from municipal “ownership” of a project, satisfying
the first criterion of § 902(2)(A).229 However, there is no
guarantee that the conduit-financed facility provides a public
service (like transportation or utilities);230 where the facility is an
office building or an industrial plant, the second criterion of
§ 902(2)(A) would not apply, meaning that the bonds would not be
backed by “special revenues.”231 As a result, if the third party
refused to make its lease or loan payments directly to the
bondholders, § 928(a) would not preserve a lien granted to the
revenue bondholders, and § 927 would not preserve the issuing
entity’s contractual protection against bondholder recourse to
other issuer assets.232
http://emma.msrb.org/MS248286-MS223594-MD435378.pdf (explaining that, in
this complex transaction involving a purchase of tobacco settlement assets from
the City of San Diego, the bankruptcy of either the city or the issuing entity
could render bondholders unsecured, reducing or eliminating payments
altogether); COFFEEVILLE SCH. DIST., STATE AID CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT BONDS 2
(1998), http://emma.msrb.org/MS140107-MS115415-MD223724.pdf (granting
bondholders an irrevocable pledge of state aid revenue which were not derived
from the “municipal ownership, operation, or disposition” of the schools
themselves, but were instead derived from the state).
228. For a brief reminder of how these transactions work, see supra notes
74–79 and accompanying text.
229. In the direct loan context, the municipality would arguably derive the
loan payments from its “disposition” of the property, which would qualify it
under the first criterion in § 902(2)(A). This assumes that the financing
documents reflect the fact that the issuing entity holds title in fee simple to the
improvements. If, however, the documents reflect that the municipality does not
hold title to the financed improvements, then this question could be hotly
contested.
230. See, e.g., ELMORE CNTY. PUB. BLDG. AUTH., supra note 77, at 4–5
(describing the project, in which the building authority will construct an office
building and lease it to the county, which may sublease it to the state).
231. See supra notes 219–222 and accompanying text (describing how the
two criteria in § 902(2)(A) work together to exclude these kinds of bonds).
232. See ELMORE CNTY. PUB. BLDG. AUTH., supra note 77, at 25 (noting that
the “filing of a bankruptcy petition by the . . . Building Authority could have the
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In the second scenario, a conduit borrower—which, under a
typical transaction, would have entered into a lease arrangement
with the conduit issuer to acquire the property purchased or

result of terminating or releasing the claim or charge of the holders of the
Warrants on such payments, in which even such holders would in effect . . . be
general unsecured creditors”); supra note 211 (noting that these provisions are
cued to the presence of “special revenues”). The terms of such bonds typically
allow no recourse to the issuing entity’s assets if the public or private entity
using the facility defaults on the underlying loan or lease agreement. See
GELFAND, supra note 47, § 3.26 (maintaining that, without specific authorization
as a “double-barreled revenue bond,” such debts are not payable from any
general funds of the issuer). Thus, the direct application of §§ 902(2), 928(a) and
552(a) in this case would defeat both the intention of Congress (in creating
§ 927) and the intent of the parties (in not providing recourse to the issuer’s
finances).
To avoid this problem, some academics have theorized that bondholders
would not have cognizable “claims” against the municipal issuer because these
pass-through payments are neither assets nor debts of the municipal issuer. See
House Hearing, supra note 62, at 31, 89 (explaining that revenue bondholders
supported by payments generated by industrial third parties do not have claims
against the issuing municipality because such “transactions do not create either
assets or debts of the municipal issuer for bankruptcy purposes” (citing S. REP.
NO. 95-989 (1978))); 9C AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2540 (“[T]he term ‘claim’ does
not include a right to payment under an industrial development bond issued by
a municipality . . . for a third party. Amounts owed by private companies to the
holders of industrial development revenue bonds are not to be included among
the assets of the municipality . . . .”).
This explanation has two problems. First, the authorities support this
narrow view of “claim” by referencing a Senate Report, which, in turn, cites a
definition of “claim” in § 902(2) that explicitly excluded claims arising out of
conduit bonds issued on behalf private industrial actors. See S. REP. NO. 95-989,
at 109–10 (1978) (noting that “all claims” against the municipality should be
included except for those predicated on “tax exempt industrial development
bonds”). This definitional provision no longer exists in § 902(2); instead, the
definition of “claim” is coextensive with the broad definition in § 101. See 11
U.S.C. § 902(2) (failing to mention the word “claim” anywhere in the statute); id.
§ 901(b) (incorporating the definitions in § 101 by implication). Under the more
general version of “claim” in the current Code, a claim is literally any right to
payment. See id. § 101(5) (defining claim as any “right to payment,” even where
such right is unmatured, disputed, unliquidated, or unsecured). Conduit
bondholders technically have such rights under the terms of the indenture. The
second problem is the narrow breadth of the exception the sources cited above
discuss. While both sources mention industrial development bonds, neither
provides any guidance as to what would happen if a 501(c)(3) or another
municipality was the conduit borrower. See House Hearing, supra note 62, at 31,
89 (predicating its conclusions on examples using industrial revenue bonds); 9C
AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 2540 (referring exclusively to industrial revenue
bonds in its explanation of the rule).
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improved with the bond proceeds—could file for bankruptcy.233 If
the conduit borrower is a municipal entity, it would almost
certainly stop making lease payments to the conduit issuer after
filing a Chapter 9 petition.234 Because those lease payments
constitute the revenue stream used to secure the bonds issued by
the conduit issuer, bondholders would have a claim against the
conduit borrower–debtor for the remaining amount due to the
conduit issuer under the lease agreement.235
Whether this claim would be secured or unsecured, however,
depends upon what funds the municipality used to make its rent
payments.236 If the municipality allocated a specific revenue
stream—such as revenue from a sublease237—for all future lease
payments, that revenue stream might qualify as “special
revenues” under § 902(2).238 However, if the municipality merely
233. See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text (describing typical
conduit financing transactions).
234. See Amdursky, supra note 39, at 16–17 (noting this as the primary
concern behind the enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 929 (2012)).
235. See 11 U.S.C. § 929 (2012) (“A lease to a municipality shall not be
treated as an executory contract or unexpired lease for the purposes of section
365 or 502(b)(6) of this title solely by reason of its being subject to termination
in the event the debtor fails to appropriate rent.”). Under § 929, a bankruptcy
court would likely conclude that the conduit transaction created a “financing
lease” as opposed to a “true lease,” meaning that the municipality could not
reject the lease after filing for bankruptcy. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 119, at
¶ 929.01 (“Section 929 makes clear that the presence in a lease of language that
permits the debtor to terminate the lease if the debtor fails to appropriate rent
does not change the fundamental characteristic of the lease as a financing lease,
notwithstanding section 365(m).”); Amdursky, supra note 39, at 16–17
(explaining that this was how § 929 was designed to work). The conduit
borrower–debtor would then have to treat the remaining amount due under the
lease agreement as a debt obligation, giving rise to a claim in bankruptcy. See
H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 8 (1988) (explaining this application); S. REP. NO.
100-506, at 10–11 (1988) (explaining §§ 365(d) and 502(b)(6) and how those
provisions would otherwise negatively impact bondholder claims in the absence
of § 929).
236. See infra notes 237–240 and accompanying text (explaining why this is
the case).
237. See, e.g., ELMORE CNTY. PUB. BLDG. AUTH., supra note 77, at 4
(explaining that the county, which was the lessee under the terms of the conduit
transaction, would make its lease payments out of revenues it received from
subleasing the property to the state).
238. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(D) (providing that “special revenues”
includes “receipts derived from particular functions of the debtor,” which could
include the ability to sublease property). Lacking any dispositive case law on
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pledged the lease payments from any available resources in its
general fund, the lease payment stream would not be composed of
“special revenues,”239 meaning that bondholders would lose any
contractual lien they were granted under the terms of the
indenture.240
2. Tax Revenue Streams
In defining “special revenues,” Congress avoided the
inclusion of broad-based taxes that already exist as part of the
“general tax levy,” like property or sales taxes.241 Instead,
Congress included three very specific kinds of taxes in the
definition of special revenues.242
First, § 902(2)(B)243 includes “special excise taxes imposed on
particular activities or transactions” in the definition of special
revenues.244 Congress intended for § 902(2)(B) to capture items
like “excise tax[es] on hotel and motel rooms or the sale of
alcoholic beverages,” provided that those items were “specifically
identified and pledged in the bond financing documents
and . . . not ‘generally’ available to all creditors under state

§ 902(2)(D), this interpretation is hypothetical at best. However, if the debtor
pledged its lease payments from a particular stream of tax revenue, that could
also qualify under § 902(2)(B), (C), or (E). See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing
which kinds of taxes could qualify as “special revenue”).
239. See infra notes 293–300 and accompanying text (explaining why funds
that are available for “general municipal purposes” cannot qualify as special
revenues under § 902(2)).
240. See supra Part II.B.3(a) (explaining why a lien on a bond not backed by
special revenues is not preserved by § 928(a)).
241. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 6 (1988) (distinguishing special property
taxes collected through a tax increment financing transaction, which would
qualify as special revenues, from general property taxes, which, as part of the
“pre-existing tax base of the community,” were not special revenues); S. REP. NO.
100-506, at 13, 21 (1988) (noting that “local sales, income or property taxes” are
only special revenues in “some instances” and inferring that a more general tax,
like a blanket sales tax, would not qualify as special revenues).
242. See infra notes 243–266 and accompanying text (describing these forms
of tax collections as special revenues).
243. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(B) (2012).
244. Id.
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law.”245 The Senate Report explicitly excluded a “general state
sales tax” from this category.246
Second, Congress designed § 902(2)(C)247 to cover a special
type of revenue bond transaction.248 Called “tax increment
financing,” this deal structure involves borrowing to fund a
project designed to benefit a given area—for example, issuing
bonds to fund landscaping, parking, and lighting in a downtown
entertainment district.249 If the project goes well, property values
in the area will increase, which will lead to a corresponding
increase in property or sales tax receipts for that same area. The
issuer will then pay those incremental increases in tax revenues,
identified in the indenture as security for the loan, directly to the
bondholders.250 The key distinction here is that tax-increment
financed projects are “not part of the pre-existing tax base of the
community”; the project itself creates a new revenue stream—the
additional property tax revenue—which is used to provide
security to bondholders.251 Section 902(2)(C) protects this revenue
stream by including “incremental tax receipts” from an area
bettered by tax-increment financing within the definition of
special revenues.252
Up to this point, none of the other definitions in § 902(2) have
included general taxes—like property, sales, and income taxes—
as special revenues.253 Thus, GO bondholders and others with
245. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 21.
246. Id.
247. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(C).
248. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 6 (1988) (noting that § 902(2)(C) is
intended to include revenues derived from “tax-increment financing” alone); S.
REP. NO. 100-506, at 21 (same).
249. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 119, ¶ 902.03 (describing tax increment
financing and noting that it is the sole concern of § 902(2)(C)).
250. Id.
251. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 6; S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 21 (1988). Because
any incremental revenue increases are paid directly to creditors, they are never
available for general municipal use and, as a result, they are not generally
available to other creditors. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 21 (describing tax
increment financing and noting this proposition).
252. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(C) (2012).
253. See 133 Cong. Rec. 31,824 (1988) (“Property, sales, and income taxes
would generally not be considered special revenues.”); supra notes 243–252 and
accompanying text (noting that neither of the two provisions permitting taxes to
qualify as special revenues allow general taxes to qualify, and the general taxes
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liens on general tax collections who want to qualify for special
revenue treatment have no other option but § 902(2)(E).254 This
Code section covers “taxes specifically levied to finance one or
more projects or systems, excluding receipts from general
property, sales, or income taxes (other than tax-increment
financing) levied to finance the general purposes of the debtor.”255
Just as each of the previous categories of “special revenue” was
predicated on an existing type of bond,256 § 902(2)(E) perfectly
encapsulates two very specific kinds of property taxes, called
“special assessments” and “special taxes,” that are issued as part
of neighborhood improvement projects.257
However, the Senate Report recognizes a broader definition:
tax receipts from assessments levied specifically to provide debt
service payments in a municipal finance transaction.258 For
instance, voters in a California municipality might approve an
extra one percent property tax levy to pay debt service on UTGO
bonds issued to fund the construction of a new hospital.259 In light
of the Senate Report, the property tax revenue raised would

involved in tax increment financing create an entirely different kind of revenue
stream than typical general taxes like sales and property taxes).
254. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(E); see infra notes 255–266 (describing how UTGO
and LTGO bondholders could qualify under this section).
255. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(E).
256. See supra notes 217–252 and accompanying text (describing each of
these categories). Section 902(2)(A) covers project finance and traditional
revenue bonds, § 902(2)(B) covers excise tax revenue bonds and other tax-based
project financing, § 902(2)(C) covers tax increment financing, and § 902(2)(D)
covers fee-backed revenue bonds.
257. See GELFAND, supra note 47, § 3:20 (explaining that municipalities use
special tax bonds to finance a “particular type of project” and that they are
typically secured by a pledge of the revenues derived from the special tax, even
if that tax is a sales, property, or income tax); id § 3:22 (describing special
assessment bonds as cousins of special tax bonds that are typically assessed
against those who benefitted from the improvement rather than against the
district as a whole).
258. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 21 (1988) (“Likewise, any special tax or
portion of a general tax specifically levied to pay for a municipal financing shall
be treated as special revenues.”).
259. See SIERRA KINGS HEALTHCARE DIST., GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS,
ELECTION OF 2006 3, 12 (2007) (describing a similar situation in California, in
which voters approved a tax increase in order to fund a general obligation bond
issuance in the amount of $20,000,000).
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qualify as “special revenues” under § 902(2)(E).260 More
importantly, in light of the statutory lien placed on such UTGO
hospital issuances in California, these UTGO bondholders would
have a lien on special revenues payable throughout the
bankruptcy under § 922(d).261 Yet, because the UTGO bond would
qualify as “special revenues,” § 927 would apply, limiting the
“unlimited tax” backing for the bondholder’s claim to a limited
portion of existing property tax revenues.262
Critically, under the plain language of § 902(2)(E), the tax
must be a new tax levied in conjunction with the bond issuance.263
It cannot be a mere rededication of existing tax revenues towards
debt service because such revenues would have originally been
“levied to finance the general purposes of the debtor.”264 The
Senate Report notes that the entire amount collected by the new
tax does not need to be dedicated exclusively to debt service.265
However, the portion of the tax that is dedicated to debt service
cannot be made available for any other general municipal
function.266
Detroit’s bankruptcy is illustrative of how the same kinds of
property taxes could lead to entirely different results under
§ 902(2)(E).267 Detroit secured its UTGO bonds with a pledge of
260. See In re Sierra Kings Healthcare Dist., No. 09-19728-B-9, 2010 WL
10018073, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (ordering the parties to draft
documents reflecting the fact that the revenues described in supra note 259
were “special revenues” under § 902(2)(E)).
261. See id. (noting the existence of this statutory lien on the revenues
derived from the tax increase); supra Part II.B.3(b) (discussing § 922(d) and
concluding that any bond secured by a statutory lien is payable during the
pendency of a bankruptcy).
262. See supra Part II.B.3(c) (explaining how and why § 927 would apply).
263. See 133 Cong. Rec. 31,824 (1987) (“[W]here a special property tax is
levied and collected for the specific purpose of paying principal and interest
coming due on bonds issued in conjunction with the levy of the property tax, the
revenues may constitute special revenues.” (emphasis added)).
264. See 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(E) (2012) (containing this limitation).
265. See S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 21 (1988) (“Likewise, any special tax or
portion of a general tax specifically levied to pay for a municipal financing shall
be treated as special revenues.” (emphasis added)).
266. See 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(E) (noting that the taxes cannot be levied to
“finance the general purposes of the debtor”); 6 COLLIER, supra note 119,
¶ 902.03[5] (“If, however, the taxes are identified and restricted in use to a
specific project or system, they may qualify as special revenues.”).
267. See infra notes 268–276 and accompanying text (explaining why this is
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new property tax revenue derived from a special election.268
Creditors alleged that the city council’s authorizing resolutions
and the voter approvals for the property tax increase limited the
use of the new revenues to the construction of certain capital
improvements—in other words, the new property taxes were not
available for the “general purposes” of the debtor.269 Thus, the
UTGO bonds could have qualified as special revenue bonds
because (1) the tax was specifically levied to finance a capital
project and (2) the tax revenues were only available to finance
payment on the bonds issued in conjunction with the project.270
Detroit secured LTGO bonds with a pledge of existing
municipal tax revenue.271 However, the revenues underlying the
LTGOs would not qualify as special revenues because the ad
valorem tax in question was not levied to finance the capital
project, but merely rededicated to finance the particular
project.272 Thus, § 902(2) would not qualify the revenue stream
backing the LTGOs as “special revenues,”273 meaning that § 927

the case).
268. See Complaint of Ambac Assurance Corporation for Declaratory
Judgment and Order, Ambac Assurance Corp. v. City of Detroit (In re City of
Detroit), No. 13-53846, 2013 WL 6162940, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 8,
2013) [hereinafter Ambac Complaint] (claiming that the UTGOs were “unique”
among the city’s obligations because they were “approv[ed] by a majority of the
voters in a city-wide election establishing a pledge of ad valorem taxes, as
security, to repay these obligations exclusively”).
269. See id. at *2–5 (explaining that the property tax revenues raised by the
new tax were intended exclusively to repay bondholders and that “the City has
no equitable or beneficial interest in . . . the proceeds of the ad valorem taxes
levied and pledged specifically to secure repayment of the Unlimited Tax
Bonds”).
270. See Chung, supra note 14, at 840 (discussing how UTGO bondholders
could have a plausible argument because “[t]here is some authority for the
proposition that . . . voter-authorized general-obligation debt for capital projects
backed by a specific tax levy that do not feed the general fund would be
considered special-revenue debt”).
271. See Ambac Complaint, supra note 268, at *3 (“The City pledged as
security for the repayment of the Limited Tax Bonds the first ad valorem taxes
collected within the constitutional tax rate limit.”).
272. See id. at *5 (admitting that the ad valorem taxes backing the LTGOs
were merely “pledged,” while the ad valorem taxes backing the UTGOs were
“levied and pledged” (emphasis added)).
273. See supra notes 263–266 (explaining why taxes must be “specifically
levied,” not merely rededicated, in order to qualify as special revenues).
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would not apply.274 Rephrased, Detroit’s UTGO bondholders, who
have recourse to all municipal assets outside of bankruptcy,
would have their claims in bankruptcy constrained to the extra
property tax revenues generated by the new ad valorem tax
levy.275 Detroit’s LTGO bondholders, who only have recourse to a
limited amount of property tax revenue outside of bankruptcy,
would have claims in bankruptcy against any available municipal
assets.276
3. Summarizing the Types of Municipal Financing that § 902(2)
Captures
As in previous sections of this Note, the extent of coverage
provided by § 902(2) lends itself to tabular summarization. This
Section presents such a chart below. In the left-hand column, it
lists the major categories of bonds discussed in this Part and in
Part II.A. In the right hand column, it summarizes the preceding
discussion on whether the underlying revenue stream in a given
type of bond deal qualifies as “special revenues” under § 902(2).

274. See 11 U.S.C. § 927 (2012) (requiring the presence of a claim against
“special revenues” in order to apply).
275. See supra Part II.B.3(c) (explaining how § 927 applies to claims against
“special revenues” and how it works to protect other municipal assets outside
the pledged revenue stream).
276. See id. (explaining why non-special revenue bondholders can make
claims against any available municipal assets).
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Table 3: Post-Bankruptcy Consequences for Municipal Debt
Bond Type
UTGO

Qualification as “Special Revenue”
Possible; depends on whether the tax backing issuance was
“specifically levied” to finance a project under § 902(2)(E).
LTGO
Doubtful; most cases would involve rededication of existing tax
revenue and would not qualify under § 902(2)(E).
Collateralized
Possible; if holders have security interest in lease payments (as
General Fund
opposed to the leased asset itself), and the municipality promises
those payments from a defined source that independently qualifies for
§ 902(2), then the lease revenue stream is special revenue.
Uncollateralized Highly doubtful; most of these pledges are made from general
General Fund
municipal funds derived from general taxation, which could not
qualify under any provision of § 902(2).
Project-Based
Probable; most public system-derived revenues qualify under
Revenue
§ 902(2)(A), and tax-derived revenues associated with projects could
qualify under § 902(2)(B), (C) or (E), depending on the tax.
Conduit-Based
Possible; if the project financed with the conduit borrowing is
Revenue (Issuer “primarily used” to provide “transportation, utility, or other services,”
Bankruptcy)
the payments from the conduit borrower will qualify; § 902(2)(A).
Conduit-Based
Possible; if municipality promises to make lease or loan payments to
Revenue
the conduit issuer from a defined source that independently qualifies
(Borrower
for § 902(2), then the revenue stream used to secure the conduit
Bankruptcy)
issuance is special revenues.
Aid/Transfer
Highly doubtful; transfers of non-tax receivables (like state aid) cannot
Revenue
qualify under § 902(2)(A) or (D). Unless the transfers are of taxes that
would otherwise qualify as special revenues under § 902(2)(B) or (E),
they will not qualify as special revenues.
Bond
Possible; the proceeds of a bond distribution for a project that would
Anticipation
generate special revenues under § 902(2)(A) would qualify as special
Notes
revenues.277 The proceeds of other bond distributions would not.278
Revenue
Possible; RANs are typically secured by the future receipt of “rents,
Anticipation
fees, charges, and other revenues other than real estate taxes.”279
Notes
These might qualify under § 902(2)(D) as “particular functions” of the
debtor or under § 902(2)(B) or (C), depending upon the type of special
tax revenue anticipated.
Tax
Doubtful; TANs are typically secured by the future collection of
Anticipation
property taxes or some other general local tax that would not qualify
Notes
as special revenues under § 902(2)(B), (C), or (E).280

277. See 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(A) (2012) (“‘[S]pecial revenues’ means . . . the
proceeds of borrowings to finance the projects or systems [contemplated by
§ 902(2)(A)] . . . .”).
278. Aside from the reference to “proceeds of borrowings” in (A), no portion
of § 902(2) references the proceeds of bond issuances, implying that the proceeds
of a borrowing predicated on special excise taxes or incremental tax receipts
would not qualify as special revenue, even if the bonds being sold are supported
by special revenue.
279. JOEL A. MINTZ ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL FINANCE 9 (2010).
280. See id. (“TANs are used in anticipation of the receipt of ad valorem
property taxes or other local taxes.”).
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B. Opening the Doorway to § 902(2)(E): In re Heffernan
The elasticity of § 902(2)(E) makes it an ideal target for GO
bondholders and for others looking to qualify for special revenue
treatment.281 However, some claimants have relied on the
legislative intent to stretch § 902(2)(E) beyond its statutory
language.282 In one such case, the court chose policy over statute,
reaching the right result for the wrong reasons.283 The case—In re
Heffernan—ultimately stands as an exemplar for why Congress
must rethink the definition of special revenues.284
1. The Opinion
In In re Heffernan, a hospital district in Calexico, California
(the District) filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 after suffering
a “multitude of operational and financial problems.”285 As part of
its plan of adjustment, the District partnered with the City of
Calexico (Calexico) to create a special authority (the Authority) to
gain access to capital markets.286 The Authority, an independent
entity free from the District’s bankruptcy, issued revenue bonds
to the general public, took the proceeds, and used them to
“purchase” the remaining outstanding creditor claims against the

281. See, e.g., In re Sierra Kings Health Care Dist., No. 09-19728-B-9, 2010
WL 10018073 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010) (containing a description of a
GO bond issuance that was payable from special revenues under Section
902(2)(E)); 6 COLLIER, supra note 119, ¶ 902.03[6][d] (maintaining that “the
boundaries of special revenue financing are being tested” by those claiming to
qualify under § 902(2)(E)).
282. See infra subpart III.B (discussing In re Heffernan, a case in which the
presiding judge stretched the boundaries of special revenues farther than the
statutory language permits).
283. See infra Part IV (discussing why the result in In re Heffernan is
actually optimal).
284. See id. (exploring the policy objectives behind the 1988 Amendments
and why an alternative definitional framework would effectuate these
objectives).
285. See In re Heffernan Mem’l Hosp. Dist., 202 B.R. 147, 148 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1996).
286. See id. (“Pursuant to the Plan, the District and the City formed the
Authority for the purpose of implementing the transactions contemplated under
the Plan . . . .”).
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District.287 To secure the bonds, the District assigned the
Authority its rights to a sales tax revenue stream.288 The District
did not directly impose the tax itself; rather, Calexico imposed
and collected the tax, then transferred all revenues collected to
the District to cover its general expenses.289 The underlying tax
that generated the revenue stream was, in effect, a general sales
tax levied against all sales of tangible personal property within
Calexico city limits.290 Calexico residents had to approve the
additional sales tax with a two-thirds majority vote before it
could be levied.291 All proceeds were “exclusively” dedicated to the
District by law.292
The court held that these sales tax revenues, though not
levied specifically to finance a new capital project, were
nevertheless special revenues under § 902(2)(E).293 Rather than
focusing on whether the taxes were “specifically levied” to
“finance a project,” the court offered a different test to determine
whether the tax revenues were “special revenues.”294 This test,
287. See id. (“The Authority will generate sufficient proceeds from the Bonds
(approximately $9 million) to pay creditors in accordance with the Plan. As a
result, the District will be indebted to the Authority on account of its “buying”
all claims against the District.”).
288. See id. (“Accordingly, the District pledged and assigned the Sales Tax
Revenue stream to the Authority to secure and provide payment to the
bondholders.” (footnote omitted)).
289. See id. at 148 n.1 (describing the electoral process by which Calexico
voters approved a 0.5% sales tax increase and dedicated the revenue stream for
the District’s use).
290. See id. (noting that the law was a general transactions and use tax);
Analysis of the Transactions And Use Tax Law, CA. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION,
http://www.boe.ca.gov/lawguides/business/current/btlg/vol1/tutl/transactionsand-use-tax-law-analysis.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (describing a
transactions and use tax as a tax on “tangible personal property sold at retail in
the district, or purchased outside the district for use in the district”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
291. In re Heffernan, 202 B.R. at 148 n.1.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 149 (concluding that the assigned revenue was “special
revenue” because the incremental sales tax in question was “available only for
the purpose of providing security and payment to the bondholders,” and because
those bondholders had no “recourse to the general revenues” of the district or
the city).
294. See id. (quoting Collier for a test that ignores the portion of the statute
requiring that the taxes not be levied to “finance the general purposes of the
debtor”).
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borrowed from Collier on Bankruptcy (a leading treatise),295 is
predicated on whether the taxes were “restricted in use to a
specific project or system.”296
To explain what “restricted in use to a specific project or
system” means, the court relied on three factors.297 First, the
agreement made the sales tax stream available to provide
“security and payment to the bondholders.”298 Second, the stream
was not available for “general municipal purposes”—in other
words, the District could no longer use the sales tax revenue
stream to cover its general expenses.299 Third, the bonds funded
by the stream were nonrecourse in nature, meaning that
bondholders could not rely on anything beyond the sales tax
revenue stream for repayment.300
2. The Collier Explanation
Collier acknowledges that the reasoning in Heffernan is
questionable.301 Merely being “[un]available for general municipal
purposes” is not sufficient to qualify a tax revenue stream as
special revenues.302 Instead, the stream must fit within one of the
five categories enumerated by the statute.303 According to Collier,
this error was harmless because the sales tax revenue stream
still qualifies as “incremental sales taxes intended to benefit the
295. See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 540 (2004) (referencing Collier
as a “leading treatise on bankruptcy law”).
296. In re Heffernan, 202 B.R. at 149.
297. See infra notes 298–300 and accompanying text (listing these three
reasons and explaining the relevance of each).
298. In re Heffernan, 202 B.R. at 149.
299. Id.
300. See id. (“[T]he Bonds do not constitute a debt or liability of the City or
the District, but are payable solely from and secured by an absolute and
irrevocable assignment and pledge of the Sales Tax Revenues to the
Authority.”).
301. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 119, ¶ 902.03[6][d] n.23 (noting that “it is not
enough for taxes to not be available for general municipal purposes” to qualify
for Section 902(2)(E) and that “the taxes at issue in [the case] were not related
to any specific project or system”).
302. Id.
303. See id. (“The taxes must fall within one of the categories specified in
section 902(2).”).
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district,” which would constitute special revenues under
§ 902(2)(C).304 However, this characterization misconstrues the
definition of tax-increment financing.305
Tax-increment financing is a very specific, statutorily
authorized financing device wholly separate from the mere
assignment of an incrementally increased sales tax.306
Tax-increment financing only works if new taxpayers, enticed by
the improvement financed with the bonds (like a new
entertainment district), spend money within the tax increment
district.307 In this case, the hospital had been in operation since
before 1975;308 the legislative intent behind the original act
authorizing the tax increase appears to have been to provide the
hospital district with additional operating capital to offset losses
incurred in providing indigent care.309 Indeed, the incidence of the
tax fell exclusively on the “pre-existing tax base of the
community,”310 which is why its implementing legislation
required mandatory voter approval.311 Thus, the tax revenue in
this case cannot be deemed “incremental tax receipts from the
304. See id. (“The Sales Tax Revenue at issue in In re Heffernan Memorial
Hospital District qualified as special revenues pursuant to section 902(2)(C) as
they were incremental sales taxes intended to benefit the District.”).
305. See infra notes 306–312 and accompanying text (describing why Collier
is incorrect in its assessment).
306. Compare CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53595.5–15 (West 2013) (containing laws
on tax increment revenue pledges and definitions), with CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 7286.20 (West 2013) (authorizing Calexico’s transactions and use tax in an
entirely different chapter of the California code).
307. See supra notes 249–252 and accompanying text (describing tax
increment financing as understood in the legislative history).
308. See In re Heffernan Mem’l Hosp. Dist., 202 B.R. 147, 148 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1996) (noting that the hospital itself had been in operation since the
District acquired its operating license in 1975).
309. See Tony Perry, Calexico Stands By Hospital Despite Health Violations,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 8, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-03-08/news/mn1584_1_calexico-hospital (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (describing the deplorable
conditions at the hospital, noting its lack of funding because of its overprovision
of indigent care, and suggesting that voters approved the “local sales tax to keep
the hospital afloat”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
310. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 21 (1988) (noting that the tax must fall on those
outside the preexisting tax base to constitute tax increment financing).
311. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 7286.20 (describing the type of tax at issue
as a “transactions and use tax at a rate of 0.5 percent,” indicating permission to
levy a general tax not pegged to capture specific improvements in the local
economy caused by the hospital).
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benefited area” without substantially broadening the definition of
special revenues in § 902(2)(C).312 If the court was correct that
these tax receipts are special revenues, they must fit the
definition given in § 902(2)(E).313
3. Assessing Heffernan: Do Tax Transfer Payments Fit Within
§ 902(2)(E)?
Section 902(2)(E) includes three key phrases: the taxes must
(1) be “specifically levied” to (2) “finance one or more projects or
systems,” and (3) those tax revenues cannot include any “general
property, sales, or income taxes . . . levied to finance the general
purposes of the debtor.”314 There are two readings of the facts in
this case that could plausibly fit two of the three elements of the
three-part definition in subsection (E).315 Both readings
ultimately omit a critical element of the definition, however, and
fail as a result.316
The first reading would maintain that the “project” was the
Authority’s bond issuance, and that, because the revenues were
pledged and assigned entirely to that purpose, they were not
general sales taxes available for the “general purposes” of the
hospital district.317 At first, the legislative history, which allows
general taxes (like sales taxes) “specifically levied to pay for a
municipal financing” to qualify as special revenues, appears to
justify this stance.318 Wholly absent from this interpretation,
though, is the fact that the tax must be “specifically levied” to
finance the proposed project or system.319 Because municipal
312. See supra notes 306–311 and accompanying text (explaining why the
tax in In re Heffernan cannot be justified under Section 902(2)(C)).
313. See infra Part III.B.3 (resolving this question in the negative under a
strict statutory interpretation but justifying this answer based on a public policy
rationale).
314. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(E) (2012).
315. See infra notes 317–325 and accompanying text (explaining these two
interpretations).
316. See id. (making this argument).
317. See supra notes 285–292 and accompanying text (describing the factual
setup of In re Heffernan from which to draw this reading).
318. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 23 (1988).
319. Id. (emphasis added).
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residents levied these taxes to close the hospital’s operating
deficit (caused by providing indigent care services), not to allow
the authority to issue bonds five years later, this reading does not
comply with the first clause of § 902(2)(E)—that the general tax
must be “specifically levied” to finance the project in question.320
The second reading of the facts in Heffernan would maintain
that the taxes were “specifically levied” to finance a system of
indigent care at the Heffernan Memorial Hospital.321 This
interpretation hinges upon whether the general sales tax at issue
was “levied to finance the general purposes” of the hospital
district.322 Had the tax proceeds been constrained to a specific use
statutorily or by city ordinance, they might meet this final
element of the “special revenues” definition. However, neither the
authorizing legislation323 nor press accounts of the voter approval
process324 indicate that the proceeds were constrained in such a
fashion. Indeed, most press accounts indicate that the revenues
were, in fact, explicitly designed to furnish the debtor hospital
district with funds for “operating expenses or general purposes,”
both of which were singled out in the Senate Report as an
examples of non-special revenues.325 Thus, neither re-reading of
In re Heffernan fits the tight definition in § 902(2)(E). However,
as Part IV suggests, any failure to fit within the statutory
definition says more about the inadequacy of the statutory

320. See supra note 309 and accompanying text (revealing that municipal
residents simply wanted to keep their hospital in operation).
321. See supra notes 285–292 and accompanying text (describing the factual
setup of In re Heffernan from which to draw this reading).
322. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(E) (2012).
323. See 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 973 (West) (failing to delineate any
restrictions on the use of the proceeds in any of the authorizing resolutions or
legislative history).
324. See Perry, supra note 309 (suggesting that the sales tax levy would go
towards the general rehabilitation of the hospital and towards offsetting the
deficits created by indigent care).
325. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 21 (1988); see, e.g., Aaron Claverie, Calexico
Hospital Board to Get Detailed Numbers of New Bond Issuance, IMPERIAL
VALLEY PRESS (July 2, 2001), http://articles.ivpressonline.com/2001-07-02/bondissuance_24201684 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (“Th[e] half-cent sales tax was
approved by Calexico voters in 1992 to offset the hospital’s losses from providing
indigent care at Calexico Hospital.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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definition than it does about the inequity of the result reached by
the court.
IV. Broadening the Doorway: Redefining Special Revenues
In drafting the 1988 Amendments, Congress had a choice
between protecting certain kinds of bonds or certain kinds of
transactions.326 Congress chose the latter.327 For example,
Congress could have written § 928 to protect “revenue bonds”
from the application of § 552(a); instead, Congress wrote it to
protect contractual liens on certain revenue streams.328 In the
same way, Congress could have written § 927 to prevent claims
by “revenue bondholders” against other municipal assets; instead,
Congress wrote § 927 to limit special revenue-based claims,
whether secured or unsecured, to those special revenue
streams.329
In taking this transactional approach, Congress had to draft
a definition for “special revenues” in § 902(2) that was broad
enough to cover all revenues “derived from a project or from a
specific tax levy where such revenues are meant to serve as
security to the bondholders.”330 To achieve its goal, Congress
would have had to include, in the definition of special revenues,
every current or future revenue stream derived from a project or a
tax levy that could possibly be used as security for revenue
bondholders. Because of the diversity and complexity of the
revenue streams municipalities rely upon to “serve as security to
[revenue] bondholders,”331 crafting a definition that includes

326. See generally Amdursky, supra note 39 (describing the history behind
the 1988 Amendments).
327. See id. at 7–8 (noting that the 1988 Amendments were designed to
protect project financing, not any particular kind of revenue or general
obligation bonds per se).
328. See 11 U.S.C. § 928(a) (2012) (cueing its application to special revenues,
not any particular type of bond).
329. See 11 U.S.C. § 927 (phrasing its protection in this manner).
330. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 6 (1988) (describing the general intent
behind the definition for “special revenues”).
331. Id.
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every possibility was difficult—if not impossible—from the
start.332
Despite this, Congress was ultimately correct in its decision
to protect transactions as opposed to types of bonds.333 Had
Congress chosen to cue the 1988 Amendments to the presence of
“revenue bonds,” there would still be the definitional issue of
what, precisely, qualifies as a “revenue bond,” the names and
characteristics of which vary widely from state to state.334 Given
the relative paucity of Chapter 9 case law,335 different courts
could reach different conclusions on a subject critical to the
success of the 1988 Amendments, leaving the municipal bond
market more unsettled than it had been before.336
The problem with the 1988 Amendments is the narrow scope
that § 902(2) imposes on the bondholder protections available
under § 928(a) and § 922(d), and the municipal protections
available under § 927.337 As in In re Heffernan, a special-purpose
district might have nothing more for operating capital than a
transferred general sales and property tax stream that it also
relies upon for “general municipal purposes.”338 Under § 902(2),
332. See, e.g., Amdursky, supra note 39, at 7–8 (noting, in a piece written
shortly after the passage of the 1988 Amendments, that the drafters already
missed a potential revenue stream in the definition for “special revenues”).
333. See infra notes 334–336 and accompanying text (making this
argument).
334. See, e.g., AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 38, § 1.3.2 (describing
dozens of types of revenue bonds, most of which do not bear the strict label of
“revenue bond” but follow the form of a revenue bond transaction).
335. See, e.g., Moringiello, supra note 19, at 405–06 (noting that “very few
municipalities have filed for bankruptcy” and that even the fact that 700 have
been filed since 1938 is misleading because most of those filings were by
“special-purpose districts”).
336. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 2–3 (1988) (reciting the history of the
financial crises in Cleveland and San Jose, which were severely exacerbated by
the uncertainty surrounding the treatment of municipal debt obligations in
bankruptcy); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 4 (1988) (same).
337. Compare supra Table 1 (establishing pre-bankruptcy expectations for
the treatment of municipal obligations), with supra Table 3 (establishing which
of those obligations are backed by special revenue), and Table 2 (outlining how
those obligations are treated given their special revenue status, which leads to
different outcomes than those described in Table 1). But see 6 COLLIER, supra
note 119, at ¶ 902.03[6][c] (“The 1988 Amendments were not intended to protect
far ranging security devices to secure loans that would be shaky if secured by a
lien only on project- or system-derived revenues.”).
338. See supra notes 285–292 and accompanying text (describing an
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the revenue in that stream is not, and cannot ever become,
“special revenues.”339 Thus, § 928(a) would not, by definition,
apply to any bonds issued by the district;340 absent state
intervention (in the form of a statutory lien), the district could not
issue bonds that would be secured in bankruptcy.341 In sum, the
narrow scope of § 902(2) not only excludes a number of common
types of revenue streams used to support revenue bonds—it
prevents certain types of municipal entities from ever offering
bankruptcy-proof contractual liens.
This Part proposes a new definition for “special revenues”
that would allow municipalities to control their own destinies in
the municipal bond market.342 It begins by establishing, as a
matter of public policy, the proper breadth of § 902(2).343 Next, it
suggests a legislative amendment that would accomplish this
goal.344 Finally, it discusses the potential for broadening § 902(2)
without legislative amendment and evaluates the proper course
moving forward.345
A. Redesigning § 902(2)
Because the revenue sources that could serve as security for
municipal bonds are legion,346 the new definition of special
identical scenario to the posed hypothetical).
339. See supra Part III.B.3 (explaining why, in the parallel factual scenario
to the posed hypothetical, the revenue stream involved could not, by definition
qualify as special revenues).
340. See 11 U.S.C. § 928(a) (2012) (preserving liens on special revenue
streams alone).
341. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the application of § 552(a), which
would, absent any intervening force, cut off any lien on the district’s revenue
stream). Unless the municipality granted a security interest in something
besides its future revenues (like some form of real property), § 552(a) would
apply. However, most municipalities lack the ability to mortgage real property,
meaning that bond financing (using future revenues) is their only recourse. See
supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text (explaining why most municipalities
cannot grant creditors security interests in real property).
342. Infra Part IV.A–B.
343. Infra Part IV.A.
344. Infra Part IV.B.
345. Infra Part IV.C.
346. See supra Table 1 (compiling a large list of potential bond funding
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revenues should be more flexible and all-inclusive than its
predecessor. Unlike the current statute, it should not be so
narrow as to exclude contractually secured bonds payable
exclusively from a limited revenue stream from the reach of
§§ 928(a) and 922(d).347 However, it should not be so broad that it
unintentionally subjects GO bonds or other devices secured by
general municipal revenues to the claim limitation provision in
§ 927.348
As a matter of public policy, a broader definition of special
revenues should benefit both cash-strapped municipalities and
their creditors.349 Markets prize certainty because it allows for
accurate valuation of potential bond deals.350 If a municipality
was able to conclusively state that (1) its bonds are backed by
special revenues, and (2) there is either a statutory or a
contractual lien on those revenues, potential purchasers could
predict the bankruptcy outcome for their bonds.351 This would
sources).
347. See supra notes 337–341 and accompanying text (describing the dire
consequences of what could happen when a municipality cannot offer bonds
backed by special revenues); Table 3 (listing several bond types that are payable
from non-special revenue sources under the current definition).
348. See supra notes 267–276 and accompanying text (explaining how this
exact scenario could happen under the current definition of “special revenues” in
§ 902(2)).
349. See infra notes 350–356 and accompanying text (explaining why this is
the case).
350. See generally James M. Kurtenbach & Jayaraman Vijayakumar,
Information Asymmetry and Municipal Revenue Bonds, 11 J. PUB. BUDGETING,
ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 177 (1999) (arguing that investors compensate for
informational asymmetry in the revenue bond market by pricing bonds
according to known facts about the issuance or the issuer, like the presence of
sinking funds to repay bondholders); Jacqueline L. Reck & Earl R. Wilson,
Information Transparency and Pricing in the Municipal Bond Secondary
Market, 25 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2006) (relying on secondary market bond
pricing data to conclude that the bond markets impound information about
municipal issuers and use that information to adjust pricing); Kelly Nolan et al.,
Detroit Bankruptcy Reverberates in Michigan and in Municipal Bond Markets,
WALL
ST.
J. (Jul. 19, 2013, 7:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873242
63404578616273666128496 (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) (explaining that many GO
bondholders who lacked information about the secured status of their bonds in
bankruptcy were selling off at a loss out of fear that what happened to the GO
bonds in Detroit could happen to them) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
351. See supra Table 2 (providing a reference guide cued to these two factors
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provide troubled municipalities desperate for a capital infusion
with a means by which to sell bonds that might not otherwise be
marketable.352 In bankruptcy, these purchasers would then
receive the “benefit of the bargain” on which they predicated the
transaction—a key goal of the 1988 Amendments.353
A broader definition could create more secured debt, which
would leave unsecured creditors like municipal employees and
pensioners with less money under a plan of adjustment.354
However, a municipality could choose not to secure bonds pledged
from a special revenue source with a contractual lien; in this case,
§ 927 would apply, limiting these unsecured bondholders to
recourse against the special revenue stream pledged to them and
keeping more money available for other unsecured creditors.355 If
the municipality did secure its special revenue bonds with a
contractual lien, all municipal residents would ultimately benefit
from the lower interest rates that creditors would be willing to
offer.356
that should conclusively indicate how every type of bond backed by a future
revenue stream should be treated in bankruptcy).
352. Cf. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 8, 27 (1988) (noting that the greater degree
of market certainty provided by the 1988 Amendments could help “troubled
municipalities which desperately need additional financing” to get the financing
they need).
353. See id. at 12 (noting that one of the key goals of the 1988 Amendments
was to ensure “that revenue bondholders receive the benefit of their bargain
with the municipal issuer, namely, they will have unimpaired rights to the
project revenue pledged to them”); In re Heffernan Mem’l Hosp. Dist., 202 B.R.
147, 148 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (establishing this as one of the primary
concerns of Congress in drafting the 1988 Amendments).
354. See Bidgood, supra note 1 (explaining how a plan of adjustment
involving bondholders with secured claims had to make “deep cuts” in pension
payments and payments to current municipal employees).
355. See supra Table 2 (explaining what happens when a special revenuebacked bond is not secured by either a contractual lien or a statutory lien).
356. See supra notes 350–353 and accompanying text (arguing that the
presence of additional information allows for more accurate bond pricing). This
would also obviate the need to purchase bond insurance, which would save
municipalities even more money. See generally Oliver Renick & Maria Bonello,
Bond Insurance Then & Now: The Revival of an Industry, BOND BUYER (Apr. 30,
2014, 6:16 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/123_83/bond-insurance-thenand-now-revival-of-industry-1062071-1.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015)
(providing a general history of bond insurance and explaining that it is only
necessary to the extent that it allows municipalities to get better interest rates
because of the protection it affords purchasers) (on file with Washington and
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However, creating an overly inclusive definition could create
additional problems for cash-strapped municipalities once they
file for bankruptcy. The beauty of the “fresh start” policy codified
in § 552(a) is that it allows the “honest but unfortunate”
municipal debtor the ability to equitably distribute its limited
resources between competing creditors—many of whom are also
its constituents.357 The broader the definition of “special
revenues” in § 902(2), the greater the likelihood that creditor
liens would be preserved by § 928(a).358 Collier on Bankruptcy
emphasizes this point in its discussion of § 902(2), noting that:
[S]ection 902(2) should not be construed as authorizing the
special treatment afforded by section 928 to liens on special
revenues unrelated to the project, system, or works for which
the bonds were issued. For example, a lien on receipts from an
existing hotel/motel tax to secure bonds issued to build a new
city college facility, or a lien on sewer tax revenues to secure
bonds for an electric generating station, should not qualify for
the special treatment afforded revenue bonds by the 1988
Amendments. Indeed, one of the objections to the 1979-80
version of the special revenue bond amendments was that they
would have enabled creditors to tie up a significant portion of
the future revenues of a municipality and exercise a
stranglehold on its finances. Such a scheme should not be
permitted through the back-door by a construction of section

Lee Law Review).
357. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (articulating one
of bankruptcy’s central goals as providing the “honest but unfortunate debtor
who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt”); Chung,
supra note 14, at 778 (describing the battle between pensioners, residents, and
lenders that played out in Detroit’s municipal bankruptcy); Michael W.
McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 470–71 (1993)
(discussing the ramifications of the fresh start policy in municipal finance, one
of which is to prevent an undue burden on a municipality’s taxpayers).
358. Because § 902(2) would apply in this hypothetical, creditors would
know that they would retain their lien on an existing revenue stream under
§ 928(a)—but only if such a lien existed in the first place. This would become the
centerpiece of the argument. Cf. In re Cnty. of Orange, 179 B.R. 185, 192–95
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (containing an example of a detailed discussion in which
the court found that the parties had created a contractual lien).
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902(2) or section 928 that unlinks the special revenue lien
from the project from which the revenues flow.359

In this passage, Collier seems to propose that, in writing
§ 902(2), Congress intended to erect a firewall between bonds
secured by project-derived revenues and bonds secured by other,
unrelated revenues.360 Assuming arguendo that this passage
accurately depicts congressional intent, it is not clear that a new
definition for “special revenues” must incorporate this firewall in
order to preserve the Bankruptcy Code’s “fresh start” policy.361 A
municipality’s elected officials could justifiably decide to issue
construction bonds for a new city college and to secure them with
existing hotel tax revenues for any number of reasons. They may
be able to obtain a better interest rate by using a stable funding
source (the existing tax revenue) rather than a volatile one (the
future revenue generated by the new college). There may be a
high market demand for bonds backed by the hotel tax and the
municipality may want to take advantage of it. Or there may
even be a strange local law against using city college receivables
as security for a bond issuance. In any event, these examples
demonstrate that municipalities make financing decisions based
on a wide array of endogenous local factors that cannot be
predicted or summarized in toto by Congress.
Ultimately, the breadth of § 902(2) relates directly to the
degree to which the “fresh start” policy should apply to
municipalities in bankruptcy. Is a municipality that pledges a
specific, limited revenue stream to secure a multi-million dollar
financing an “honest but unfortunate” debtor deserving of
§ 552(a)’s protection? In most cases, the answer is no. In
corporate bankruptcy, § 552(a) provides relief to businesses that
359. 6 COLLIER, supra note 119, ¶ 902.03[6][c].
360. See id. (implying that the “special revenue lien” should always be
linked to the “project from which the revenues flow”).
361. Ultimately, Collier makes its point in this passage with the aid of a
straw man. If a project itself generates its own revenues, then it makes
economic and practical sense to secure bonds sold to fund that project with the
revenues it generates. The trickier question that Collier avoids is what should
happen to a non-revenue generating project, like the indigent care ward run by
Heffernan Memorial. See Perry, supra note 309 (describing the indigent care
service that the hospital provided and the need to finance the hospital with
outside revenues because provision of indigent care involved huge capital
outlays without much return on investment).
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would not otherwise be able to acquire or sell its inventory or
equipment free and clear of a creditor’s lien.362 It facilitates the
debtor’s “fresh start” by allowing the debtor to pocket the profits
from sales of inventory acquired postpetition.363 Without the
ability to pocket those profits, the debtor would have no capital to
run its business, and reorganization would be impossible.364
The situation in Chapter 9 is entirely different. Unlike the
inventory pledged in the corporate bankruptcy hypothetical, a
municipality does not depend on the revenue pledged under the
terms of an indenture for its very survival.365 On the contrary,
under the terms of a typical indenture, a municipality loses
access to the revenue stream used to secure a bond issue from the
moment of issuance until it makes the final principal payment.366
The pledged revenue stream should play no part in the
municipality’s reorganization because, under the terms of the
typical indenture, it never belonged to the municipality in the

362. See Craig H. Averch, The Heartbreak Hotel for Secured Lenders: When
Postpetition Revenue from A Hotel Is Not Subject to A Prepetition Security
Interest, 107 BANKING L.J. 484, 487 n.14 (1990) (“[T]he underlying policy of § 552
is to aid a debtor’s reorganization efforts by treating, as unencumbered,
property acquired postpetition that would, but for § 552, be encumbered . . . .”).
363. See RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 146, at 129 (providing an example
that reaches this conclusion).
364. See Averch, supra note 362, at 487 n.14 (noting the link between the
debtor’s “fresh start” and its ability to treat inventory that would otherwise be
encumbered as unencumbered assets).
365. Compare supra notes 362–364 and accompanying text (noting the
critical role that the encumbered inventory and other assets freed by § 552 play
in corporate reorganization), with infra notes 366–367 and accompanying text
(describing how the funds pledged in a municipal bond transaction are not at all
critical to the municipality’s reorganization).
366. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 8–9 (1988) (discussing a typical
revenue bond issuance, which is secured by revenue generated from the funded
enterprise that is unavailable for general municipal purposes from the time of
issuance until the bonds are settled); Ambac Complaint, supra note 268, at *5
(arguing that Detroit had no “equitable or beneficial interest” in the property
tax revenues used to fund its UTGO and LTGO issuances); CITY OF SAN DIEGO
TOBACCO SETTLEMENT REVENUE FUNDING CORP., supra note 227, at S-1 to -15
(outlining a transactional structure in which the Settlement Revenue Funding
Corporation had no right to the tobacco settlement payments pledged to its
bondholders); ELMORE CNTY. PUB. BLDG. AUTH., supra note 77, at 4–6 (outlining
a transactional structure in which the issuer has no right to the lease payment
revenue stream used to support the bonds).
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first place.367 Even if the pledged stream does not directly relate
to the project itself, the very fact that the municipality was
willing to irrevocably dedicate a revenue source to creditors
(cutting off its own access to that revenue source in the process)
demonstrates that the source is not necessary to an effective
reorganization. Thus, in crafting a broader § 902(2), Collier’s
proposed limiting principle—that “special revenues” should only
include revenue directly related to the financed project—should
be rejected.
There is one limited context in which § 552(a) performs the
same role in Chapter 9 that it does in Chapters 7 or 11. When
§ 552(a) terminates a contractual lien on all revenues in a
municipal general fund, on all tax revenue, or on all collected
receipts, it has the same effect of freeing a municipality to use its
generally available funds in pursuit of its “fresh start.”368 Thus,
the definition of special revenues should not include “generally
available municipal funds,” “all available tax revenue,” or “all
available receipts.” This limiting principle more effectively
accomplishes the goal set out by Collier—preventing creditors
from placing a “stranglehold” on a municipality’s available
finances.369
B. Legislative Revision to Chapter 9
The most obvious way to alter the definition of “special
revenues” is to amend § 902(2). Given the concerns discussed in
Part IV.A, a new definition for special revenues must toe the line
between overinclusion and underinclusion. It should include any
source of revenue intended by the municipality to be used

367. See sources cited supra note 366.
368. This was the reason that Congress was so insistent in the legislative
history that “special revenues” should not be broad enough to include revenues
collected for the “general purposes” of the debtor. See H.R REP. NO. 100-1011, at
4 (1988) (“Special revenue bonds are issued so that if the asset financed fails,
repayment will not come out of general treasury funds—meaning the taxpayer
will not have to foot the bill.”); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 9 (1988) (making
substantially the same point).
369. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 119, ¶ 902.03[6][c] (claiming this as the
primary objection to a previous version of the 1988 Amendments).
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exclusively for the benefit of its bondholders,370 but it should not
include sources of revenue that a municipality would depend
upon for a successful reorganization.371 Thus, the new definition
should read:
§ 902(2): “special revenues” means any specific source of
revenue that (a) is irrevocably pledged and assigned under an
indenture,
bond
resolution,
or
similar
contractual
arrangement to an indenture trustee, bondholders, or other
direct beneficiaries and (b) is clearly identified in the
indenture as “special revenues under § 902(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code;” provided, however, that special revenues
shall under no circumstances consist of generally available
municipal funds, including all available tax revenue or all
available receipts.

This new statutory definition benefits each of the three
groups—bondholders, municipalities, and taxpayers—that
Congress referenced in the legislative history to the 1988
Amendments.372 For bondholders, the new definition guarantees
that almost any revenue stream pledged for their exclusive use
and secured with a contractual lien will remain secured under
§ 928(a).373 This guarantee allows bondholders to retain
“unimpaired rights to the . . . revenue pledged to them.”374
The inclusion of new § 902(2)(b) ultimately cedes control of
the scope of “special revenues” to municipalities. Under proposed
§ 902(2)(b), a revenue stream could not qualify as “special
revenues” unless the municipality assents in advance. In other
words, the municipality itself—not Congress or the courts—would

370. See supra notes 365–367 and accompanying text (explaining why this
exclusive use limitation comports with the rejection of the fresh start policy in
this instance).
371. See supra notes 368–369 and accompanying text (describing this
concern).
372. See In re Heffernan Mem’l Hosp. Dist., 202 B.R. 147, 148 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1996) (listing these as the three primary groups that Congress considered
in drafting the 1988 Amendments).
373. See 11 U.S.C. § 928(a) (2012) (applying only where bonds are backed by
a contractual lien on special revenues).
374. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12 (1988); see 100 CONG. REC. S16,230 (daily ed.
Nov. 12, 1987) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini) (noting that bondholders
have a “legitimate expectation to rely on and receive specific collateral”).
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have the authority to dictate whether its bonds receive “special
revenue” treatment.375
This new qualifier benefits bondholders as well because it
provides them with greater certainty when entering the
transaction.376 This certainty allows for more effective risk
assessment and, as a result, better pricing.377 In theory, this
greater certainty should redound to the municipality’s benefit, as
well, by providing them with lower interest rates on transactions
involving special revenues.378 Additionally, it gives financially
distressed special purpose entities without other funding sources
the ability to issue bonds that they know will be secured in
bankruptcy.379
Municipal residents stand to benefit from the new definition
because it works with § 927 to prevent revenue bondholders with
claims based “exclusively” on special revenues from seeking other
available municipal sources for repayment.380 The broader the
definition in § 902(2), the greater the protection to taxpayers
afforded by § 927. For example, under the new § 902(2), creditors
with claims predicated on a pledge of state sales tax revenue
(which is not covered by the current definition) could not make a
claim in bankruptcy against local property tax collections.381
Thus, the new scope of § 902(2) actually affords stronger
protection to municipal taxpayers than ever before.

375. See supra Table 2 (providing a summary of the benefits of qualification
as special revenues).
376. Because bondholders will know whether their bonds qualify for the
protections afforded to debt backed by special revenues, they need only answer
the question of whether their bonds are backed by statutory or contractual liens
in order to get a full picture of how bankruptcy will affect them. See supra Table
2 (outlining this process).
377. See sources cited supra note 366.
378. See id.
379. Municipalities would only issue these bonds if they were willing to pay
the steep interest rates that would almost certainly accompany them. However,
they might make an attractive alternative to a cash-strapped municipality that
has already hit its general obligation debt limit but needs additional working
capital to stay out of bankruptcy.
380. 11 U.S.C. § 927 (2012).
381. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (explaining why state aid
transfer payments do not qualify as special revenues); Table 3 (listing these as
“possible” special revenues).
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Finally, it properly aligns the policy objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code with the protections afforded to bondholders by
§ 928(a) and to municipalities by § 552(a). Where a revenue
stream is “irrevocably pledged” to bondholders, municipalities
lose access to it.382 Thus, the inclusion of the “irrevocably pledged”
qualifier means that special revenues would not otherwise be
available to assist a municipality in getting a “fresh start” during
reorganization. Next, the inclusion of the clause beginning with
“provided” at the end of the definition guarantees that “special
revenues” does not include any revenue that a municipality
would depend upon for its fresh start.383 If a municipality granted
a contractual lien on “all available revenues,” § 928(a) would not
apply because those revenues would not qualify as “special
revenues” under the new § 902(2), and § 552(a) would terminate
the lien.
C. Judicial and Market Revision of Chapter 9
The slow pace at which Congress typically acts becomes even
more glacial when it comes to Chapter 9 revisions.384 In the event
that Congress chooses not to fix the § 902(2) problem in a timely
manner, two cases—In re Heffernan and In re Sierra Kings
Healthcare District385—provide a possible market-based solution.
In Heffernan, the court introduced a new test for “special
revenues” that asks whether the revenues were “restricted in use
to a specific project or system.”386 The three factors relied upon by
the court in making this determination were: (1) whether the tax

382. See supra notes 362–367 and accompanying text (providing support for
this assertion).
383. Cf. supra notes 368–369 and accompanying text (discussing the one
limited situation in which § 552(a) does work to preserve the municipal debtor’s
ability to obtain a fresh start).
384. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 119, ¶ 900.LH (noting that there have only
been two or (arguably) three significant updates to Chapter 9 since it was made
permanent in the mid-1940s, and that for most of its life, it has remained
“unchanged and virtually unused”).
385. No. 09.19728-B-9, 2010 WL 10018073 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010).
386. In re Heffernan Mem’l Hosp. Dist., 202 B.R. 147, 149 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1996).
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revenue was not available for “general municipal purposes;”387 (2)
whether the tax revenue existed exclusively “for the purpose of
providing security and payment to the bondholders;”388 and (3)
whether the bondholders did not have recourse to any other
general revenues besides those specified in the indenture.389
Many—if not most—of the bonds backed by tax revenues but
not currently covered by § 902(2) should fit within this broader
“restricted in use to a specific project or system” test. Using this
case as precedent, bond counsel could insert the following phrase
into each new indenture they draft:
The parties acknowledge that any funds described in this
Indenture as a Source of Payment for the Bonds (a) are
impressed with a [statutory lien] [contractual lien] and (b) are
“special revenues” under the definition provided by § 902(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code and existing case law interpreting this
provision. The Borrower [or other municipal entity]
irrevocably waives the right to assert and covenants not to
assert any contention in the future that funds described as a
Source of Payment are not “special revenues” under 11 U.S.C.
§ 902(2).

At first blush, such a provision seems unenforceable in
bankruptcy. It is, after all, “emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is,”390 and an
agreement dictating the legal application of a statutory definition
seems suspect. Such an agreement, however, appears to be fully
enforceable—and, indeed, encouraged—under In re Sierra
Kings.391
In Sierra Kings, a healthcare district defaulted on its debt
and declared bankruptcy on October 8, 2009.392 A portion of this
debt included principal and interest payments owed on GO bonds
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. See id. (“[T]he Bonds do not constitute a debt or liability of the City or
the District, but are payable solely from and secured by an absolute and
irrevocable assignment and pledge of the Sales Tax Revenues to the
Authority.”).
390. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
391. See infra notes 392–398 and accompanying text (describing the facts in
In re Sierra Kings).
392. In re Sierra Kings Health Care Dist., No. 09.19728-B-9, 2010 WL
10018073, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2010).
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issued in 2002 and 2007 to upgrade and expand several existing
facilities owned by the district.393 Both issuances were gardenvariety GO bonds secured by general ad valorem taxes without
limitation as to rate or amount.394
Objectively, the voter-approved ad valorem tax revenue
pledged as security for the bonds may fit into the narrow
definition in § 902(2)(E) because it came from a new tax
specifically levied to finance a project.395 However, the presiding
judge never explicitly made that determination himself. Instead,
he signed an order requiring the debtor to:
enter into agreements with the appropriate parties to reaffirm
and protect the interests and rights of the holders of the 2002
Bonds and the holders of the 2007 Bonds, each such
agreement to provide for, among other things: . . . (c) the
recognition of such ad valorem taxes396 as “special revenues”
as defined in 11 U.S.C. section 902(2)(e) of the Bankruptcy
Code . . . . [In addition, the order required the debtor to]
waive[] and withdraw[] any contention by it and covenant[] not
393. See SIERRA KINGS HEALTHCARE DIST., supra note 259, at 12 (“A portion
of the proceeds of the Bonds will be used by the District to (i) complete more
stringent earthquake and handicap accessibility standards . . . , (ii) construct an
approximate 8,000 square-foot Birthing Center expansion, and (iii) complete an
approximate 16,000 square-foot expansion, renovation and equipping
program . . . .”).
394. See id. at 8–9 (“The Bonds are general obligations of the District and
the District has the power and is obligated to cause to be levied and collected by
the County annual ad valorem taxes for payment when due of the principal of
and interest on the bonds upon all property within the District subject to
taxation by the District without limitation as to rate or amount.”).
395. See In re Sierra Kings, 2010 WL 10018073, at *4 (describing the
collection mechanism by which the district levied the property taxes and paid
them over to bondholders). Under the terms of the Bond Resolution, the district
caused the county in which it was located to levy the property taxes used to
repay the bondholders. Id. The county paid all property taxes collected into a
special interest and sinking funds made available exclusively for bondholder
repayment and not for the general use of the district. Id. If any money remained
in the fund after the district repaid the bonds, it was to be refunded to the
county taxpayers. Id. Thus, the tax revenue would certainly have qualified as
“special revenues” under the Heffernan test because (1) it was not available for
the “general purposes” of the district, (2) it existed solely to provide “security
and payment” to the bondholders, and (3) bondholders had no recourse to other
funds under the indenture.
396. “Such” ad valorem taxes are “ad valorem taxes levied or collected for
the payment of principal of or interest on the 2002 Bonds or 2007 Bonds.” See In
re Sierra Kings, 2010 WL 10018073, at *6.
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to assert any contention in the future . . . that the ad valorem
taxes levied to pay the Bonds are not “special revenues” under
11 U.S.C. § 902(2)(E).397

By issuing this order, the judge approved an independent
agreement between the parties that (1) stipulated to the fact that
the tax receipts were special revenues and (2) waived any right to
challenge that determination in the future.398
Together, In re Heffernan and In re Sierra Kings offer a
narrow sliver of hope for non-legislative reform. When liberally
construed, Heffernan stands for the broader proposition that the
exact wording in § 902(2) should not dictate which revenue
streams are “special” and which are not.399 In reliance on this
broader principle in Heffernan, municipalities issuing bonds that
fall into one of the gray areas highlighted in Table 3 could insert
clauses similar to the one proposed above into the indenture. If
the municipality files for bankruptcy protection, there are two
possible scenarios: either (1) the bankruptcy court declares the
waiver ineffective and holds that § 902(2) does not apply; or
(2) the waiver is effective and § 902(2) applies.
In the worst-case Scenario (1), the result is the same as the
status quo; even without inserting the proposed clause, a
bankruptcy judge could find that § 902(2) does not apply to, say,
LTGOs. In the best case Scenario (2), insertion of the proposed
clause creates a far better result than the status quo. Following
the model established by In re Sierra Kings, a judge could decide
to preserve the intent of the parties and permit both sides to
enjoy the benefits (for bondholders)—and drawbacks (for the
municipality)—of the bargain they negotiated. In short, inserting
the proposed clause has a substantial upside and, at worst, has
no downside whatsoever.
Nevertheless, there are doubts as to whether this approach
would work in practice. First, it glosses over the fact that, aside
from In re Heffernan, no precedent exists to declare anything that

397. Id.
398. See id. (permitting both features).
399. See In re Heffernan Mem’l Hosp. Dist., 202 B.R. 147, 149 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1996) (ignoring the strict statutory language in favor of an alternative test
proposed by Collier); supra Part III.B.3 (explaining why the Heffernan decision
went beyond the scope of what § 902(2)(E) technically permits).
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does not fit within § 902(2) to be “special revenues.”400 Much of
the gray area discussed in Table 3 does not fit neatly within any
of the five existing definitional sections, and extending Heffernan
to cover a revenue source that resembles § 902(2)(A) or
§ 902(2)(D) may be a bridge too far. Next, it assumes that all
municipalities and their bond counsel are aware of the existence
of § 902(2), let alone the problems it could pose. Without
knowledge of the problems § 902(2) could pose, neither
municipalities nor their lawyers would think to protect
themselves in the first place.
Finally, it ignores the rate at which municipalities file
Chapter 9 cases. Because of the low number of Chapter 9 filings,
only three judicial opinions have relied on § 902(2) in any
capacity.401 There is little likelihood that a bankruptcy court
would ever have the opportunity to test a clause like the one
suggested above. Without judicial precedent on which to rely,
parties are unlikely to give such a clause much weight and will
price the deal as though it did not exist.
While these issues are vexing, the simple answer to the
problems they present is this: why not? There is no downside to
inserting the proposed language into an indenture when such a
provision is freely negotiated and both sides understand the
consequences. At best, the clause preserves the benefits that the
parties bargained for in the first instance—the same bargain
which served as a basis for pricing the deal. At worst, the clause
gets thrown out in bankruptcy, and the parties are left to argue
over whether In re Heffernan applies.
Recognition of this problem by the National Association of
Bond Lawyers, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or a
400. See Zev Shechtman, Compendium of Judicial Decisions Under Chapter
9 of the Bankruptcy Code As of August 15, 2012, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 339, 369
(2012) (mentioning only one other case in its discussion of precedent involving
“special revenues” and noting that that case did not interpret the definition of
special revenues but rather addressed the scope of §§ 922(d) and 928(b)).
401. See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Jefferson Cnty. (In re Jefferson Cnty.), 482
B.R. 404, 428 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012) (holding that sewer fee revenues, sewer
taxes, and the interest they generated in a holding account all collectively
qualified as “special revenues” under § 902(2)(A)); In re Sierra Kings Health
Care Dist., No. 09.19728-B-9, 2010 WL 10018073, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Sept.
13, 2010) (citing and relying on § 902(2)(E)); In re Heffernan, 202 B.R. at 148–49
(same).
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similar trade or regulatory association would go a long way
towards effectuating this potential solution. With increased
awareness would come additional insertions of the language
described above into the form documents used by most bond
counsel. As more and more bond counsel adopted this clause and
inserted it into their form documents, the likelihood of a judicial
test case would increase exponentially. In addition, the potential
futility of solving the problem in such a piecemeal fashion might
become evident to Congress, which would spur the passage of an
amendment to fix § 902(2) once and for all.
V. Conclusion
As of the writing of this Note, it is unclear whether the
aftershocks of the Great Recession will claim another round of
municipal victims.402 However, as Chapter 9 filings become more
and more common, there are some signs that the stigma
traditionally associated with municipal bankruptcy may be
fading.403 When the next financial crisis comes, municipalities
across the country will consider whether they are willing to bear
the reputational damage in exchange for the protections afforded
by Chapter 9. Those municipalities considering bankruptcy
should know, with a reasonable degree of certainty, what fate
awaits their outstanding bonds. This Note posits that an overly
narrow definition of “special revenues” obfuscates the otherwise
402. See R. Theodore Clark, Jr., Public Sector Collective Bargaining at the
Crossroads, 44 URB. LAW. 185, 221 & n.161 (2012) (noting that there has been a
“virtual onslaught of articles and speeches” predicting a coming wave of
municipal bankruptcy filings and compiling several articles in support of the
proposition); Timothy R. Casey & Daniel Northrop, Chapter 9: An Rx for Health
Care Districts and Public Hospital Authorities?, DRINKER BIDDLE (Oct. 14, 2013)
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/resources/publications/2013/Chapter-9-An-Rx-forHealth-Care-Districts-and-Public-Hospital-Authorities (last visited Apr. 2, 2015)
(mentioning the uptick in healthcare district Chapter 9 filings, which could be
particularly relevant given the fact that In re Heffernan and In re Sierra Kings
were both healthcare cases) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
403. See, e.g., Liz Farmer, The ‘B’ Word: Is Municipal Bankruptcy’s Stigma
Fading?, GOVERNING (Mar. 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/govbword-stigma-municipal-bankruptcy-going-away.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2015)
(“There’s a growing sense among some leaders that municipal bankruptcy—
unthinkable just a few years ago—may be a valuable tool.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).

1032

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 955 (2015)

clear effects of §§ 928(a), 922(d), and 927 in a way that could
materially impact a municipality’s choice about whether to file for
bankruptcy in the first place.404 It proposes two solutions, but
ultimately concludes that the best way to resolve the problems
created by § 902(2) is to raise awareness of its effects.405 That
way, our elected officials can make better and more informed
choices about the debt burden they place on future generations.

404.
405.

Supra Part III.
Supra Part IV.

